Under the command of General A.A. Brusilova The Southwestern Front carried out the most successful strategic operation of the First World War in 1916
During the First World War, Russia and its Entente allies tried to coordinate the actions of their armies. In the summer of 1916, a general offensive of the Allied forces was planned. At a meeting in Chantilly (France) in February 1916, it was decided, in particular, that Russian troops would strike no later than June 2 (15). And no later than June 18 (July 1), the British and French were to launch an offensive. But in February, the Germans launched attacks near Verdun, and in May, Austro-Hungarian troops unleashed a severe blow on the Italians.
The temperamental Italians got scared and began sending panicked telegrams to the French and Russians. They demanded from the former to influence the Russians, and from the latter to immediately go on the offensive in order to distract the Austrians from Italy. Let us note that the Russians always fulfilled their allied obligations, but the allies acted as they saw fit. For example, they did not move when in 1915 the Russian army was retreating, suffering heavy losses and in need of support. But in 1916, the Russians were required to attack in order, among other things, to pull German forces away from the French Verdun. As it turned out later, the British then refused to go to the aid of the French.
And the Italian king Victor Emmanuel III sent a telegram to Nicholas II. According to his “highest” logic, for some reason only the Russians had to save Italy from defeat.
However, on May 18 (31), the king answered the Italian king as follows: “My chief of staff reported to me that on May 22 (June 4) my army will be able to launch an attack on the Austrians. This is even somewhat earlier than the date set by the Allied Military Council... I decided to undertake this isolated offensive in order to assist the brave Italian troops and in consideration of your request.”
The Italians, by the way, even thought about whether they should capitulate to the Austrians. Later it turned out that their fears were greatly exaggerated. At the same time, they diverted more than 20 Austrian divisions to themselves, and the collapse of Italy would have dealt the Entente both a military and, what was no less important for the allies, a moral blow.
The defense of the Austro-Hungarian troops was considered impregnable. The Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Infantry General M. Alekseev, reported to the Tsar on March 31 (April 13), 1916: “The totality of the actions of troops under modern conditions, as experience on the French and our fronts shows, indicates that it is hardly possible to count on execution in one a method of deep penetration into the enemy’s position, although a second line of corps would be placed behind the shock corps.” In other words, the Headquarters did not plan to defeat the enemy. She set more modest tasks for the troops: to inflict losses on the enemy. Although, it would seem, when planning a major operation, it should have clearly and clearly reflected in its directive the operational-strategic goal for which the operation was planned.
At the April meeting at Headquarters, when discussing the plan for the upcoming campaign, the generals, for the most part, were also not particularly eager to go into battle. The Commander-in-Chief of the Northern Front, General A. Kuropatkin, said, for example: “It is absolutely impossible to break through the German front, because their fortified zones are so developed and strongly fortified that it is difficult to imagine success.”
In turn, the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Front, General A. Evert, completely agreed with Kuropatkin and said that the most acceptable way of conducting combat operations for the Western Front was defense. But the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, General Brusilov, had a different opinion. He decisively stated that the Southwestern Front was not only ready for an offensive, but also had a good chance of operational success.
To assert this, of course, required military talent and great courage.
“I am firmly convinced,” he said, “that we can attack... I believe that the disadvantage that we have suffered so far is that we do not attack the enemy on all fronts at once, in order to stop the opportunity to enjoy the benefits of internal action. operational lines, and therefore, being significantly weaker than us in the number of troops, he, using his developed network of railways, transfers his troops to one place or another at will. As a result, it always turns out that in the area that is being attacked, at the appointed time he is always stronger than us, both technically and quantitatively. Therefore, I urgently ask permission for my front to act offensively simultaneously with my neighbors; even if, beyond my expectations, I had not even been successful, then at least I would not only have delayed the enemy’s troops, but also attracted part of his reserves to myself and in this powerful way would have facilitated the task of Evert and Kuropatkin.”
Brusilov, later describing this meeting at Headquarters, noted that General Kuropatkin approached him during the lunch break and made the remark: “You have just been appointed commander-in-chief, and you are fortunate enough not to go on the offensive, and, therefore, not to risk your military reputation, which now stands high. Why do you want to be subjected to major troubles, perhaps being replaced from your position and losing that military aura that you have managed to earn so far? If I were you, I would do my best to disavow any offensive operations..."
The Headquarters Directive of April 11 (24), 1916 defined the following tasks: “1. The general goal of the upcoming actions of our armies is to go on the offensive and attack the German-Austrian troops... 4. The South-Western Front, disturbing the enemy throughout its entire location, makes the main attack with the troops of the 8th Army in the general direction of Lutsk.” The headquarters did not plan operations in depth, trying to limit themselves to a breakthrough and the desire to inflict as many losses on the enemy as possible. And the Southwestern Front was generally assigned a supporting role. But General Brusilov thought differently.
The troops of Archduke Joseph-Ferdinand defended against the Southwestern Front. Initially, Brusilov was opposed by four Austrian and one German army (448,000 bayonets, 38,000 sabers, 1,300 light and 545 heavy guns).
The enemy compensated for the slight numerical disadvantage with an abundance of equipment and the power of defense. In nine months, three defensive lines were built at a distance of 5 km from one another. The first was considered the most durable - with support units, pillboxes, cut-off positions that lead the enemy into a “bag” for extermination. The trenches had concrete canopies, deep dugouts were equipped with reinforced concrete vaults, and machine guns were located under concrete caps. There were also 16 rows of barbed wire, some with electric current running through them. Bombs were hung on the wire, mines and landmines were placed around, abatis, “wolf pits”, and slingshots were made. And in the Russian trenches, Austro-German flamethrowers were waiting.
Behind such a skillfully equipped first strip there were two more, albeit a little weaker. And although the enemy was sure that it was impossible to break through such a defense, he prepared a rear defensive position 10 km from the first line. When Kaiser Wilhelm II visited the front, he was delighted: he had not seen such strong positions, as it seemed to him then, even in the West, where opponents had been very successful in this matter over several years of trench warfare. At the same time, at an exhibition in Vienna, models of defensive structures from the Austro-Hungarian front were demonstrated as the highest achievement of German fortification. And the enemy believed so much in the impregnability of his defense that a few days before the Brusilov offensive, the question was even discussed about whether it would be dangerous to remove a couple of divisions from this front in order to defeat Italy as quickly as possible. It was decided that there would be no danger, since the Russians had been constantly plagued by misfortunes for the past year, and this trend was unlikely to change.
However, the Germans and Austrians relied primarily on heavy artillery. Its ratio was as follows: 174 heavy guns against 76 Russians in the 8th Army sector, 159 against 22 in the 11th Army sector, 62 against 23 in the 7th Army sector, 150 against 47 in the 9th Army sector.
With such superiority, the Germans still complained that too many heavy batteries were transferred to the Italian front. But the most important thing: the enemy did not believe that after the severe defeats of 1915, the Russians were generally capable of anything more or less serious. The chief of staff of the German army group, General Stolzmann, boastfully declared: “The possibility of Russian success is excluded!”
Apparently the Germans have forgotten who they are dealing with. The Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front was not one of those generals who are called parquet (their entire service takes place at headquarters - on parquet floors, not in the trenches - from second lieutenant to general). Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov (1853 - 1926) came from a family of hereditary military men. He lost his parents early and at the age of 4 was enrolled in the Corps of Pages, where guard officers were trained. However, he did not aspire to join the elite units, and, frankly speaking, the funds for service in the guard were not enough. After completing his studies in the Corps of Pages in the summer of 1872, the young officer chose to serve in the 15th Tver Dragoon Regiment, which was stationed in Kutaisi. (Brusilov, by the way, was born in Tiflis). There, the 19-year-old warrant officer was appointed junior platoon officer of the 1st squadron. When the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 began, Brusilov took part in hostilities literally from the first days. For the military campaign he was awarded the Order of St. Stanislaus, 3rd degree. And then there was service in various positions in the Russian Imperial Army. In the summer of 1913, cavalry general A. Brusilov took command of the 12th Army Corps in the Kiev Military District.
With the outbreak of World War I, Brusilov was appointed commander of the 8th Army. The troops of his army advanced to the border and soon entered into battle with the Austrian cavalry. The enemy was defeated, his remnants fled across the river. Zbruch. On the river The enemy Koropets tried to stop Brusilov’s troops, but was again defeated. And he retreated to the Galician city of Galich. And Brusilov moved towards Lvov. Along the way we took Galich. The battle lasted three days. The Austrians lost more than five thousand people killed. For the capture of Galich, General Brusilov received the Order of St. George, 4th degree.
Soon the Austrians tried to make a detour west of Lvov. Brusilov, with the troops of the right flank and center, gave the enemy a counter battle (the most difficult type of combat operations), and with the troops of the left flank he took up a strong defense. The enemy suffered massive losses, retreated and decided to gain a foothold in the Carpathian passes in order to block the Russian troops from reaching the Hungarian plain.
In the Battle of Galicia, the first major battle of the Russian army in the Great War, the troops of General Brusilov defeated the 2nd Austro-Hungarian Army, only taking more than 20 thousand prisoners. Brusilov's army repelled all enemy attempts to relieve the city of Przemysl, besieged by the Russians.
In the most difficult year for the Russian army, 1915, the troops of General Brusilov carried out active defensive actions, inflicting serious losses on the enemy. The successes of A. Brusilov could not go unnoticed. In March 1916, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, and in April he was awarded the rank of adjutant general. The army headquarters was then located in Zhitomir. There was a little more than a month left before the attack...
The front commander, General Brusilov, did not waste time. He paid special attention to intelligence - from regimental to army and front-line. All information obtained about the enemy was concentrated at the front headquarters. For the first time in that war, Brusilov made extensive use of aerial reconnaissance data, including photographs. Let us add that a fighter air group was also formed for the first time on the Southwestern Front. It ensured the dominance of Russian aviation in the air. Our pilots carried out bombing attacks, fired machine guns at the enemy, and supported the infantry on the battlefield.
To mislead the enemy, false radio messages were widely used on the Southwestern Front. Genuine orders, instructions, and instructions were transmitted to the troops exclusively by courier, by courier mail. False artillery positions were created. The front headquarters spread misinformation about the offensive that the Germans were allegedly preparing to the north of Polesie. Therefore, they say, the Southwestern Front must be ready to come to the rescue of General Evert. To be more convincing, the corps were ordered to prepare for an offensive in many places, using trench work to turn their positions into a springboard for an attack. Brusilov told the army commanders: it is necessary to create a complete illusion that the front will strike at 20 points.
As a result, the Austro-Hungarian command was unable to determine where the Russians would deliver the main blow. The Austrians thought in a stereotyped way: where Russian cannons would continuously fire for several days, that’s where they should wait for the main attack.
And it was a miscalculation. Brusilov gave precise instructions to the artillery for the period of breaking through the enemy defenses. Light guns were supposed to first destroy the wire fences, then destroy the machine guns. The targets of medium and heavy artillery were communication trenches and main defensive positions. As soon as the infantry rose to attack, the light artillery had to concentrate fire on the enemy's artillery batteries. Then the heavy guns immediately transferred the fire to the far lines of the enemy’s defense.
The Brusilov breakthrough gave rise to such a thing as a barrage of fire. This was a short shelling of targets, under the direct cover of which the attack began. Under dense artillery fire, the enemy could not offer decisive resistance. The attacking units broke into the first line of enemy trenches. Before this, literally in seconds, the barrage of fire was transferred to the second line of defense, then to the third, etc. And almost closely behind the rampart walked the grenadiers or, as they were called, “trench cleaners.” Grenadier teams burst into enemy trenches as soon as the barrage of fire moved further. The enemy was still sitting in the dugouts, and one grenade thrown there was enough to destroy a dozen enemy soldiers.
Based on the situation on the fronts, General Brusilov foresaw that Headquarters would order the offensive to begin on May 28-29. In order to completely mislead the enemy, he ordered all preparations to be completed by May 19. And on the 20th, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Front received an order to begin the offensive on May 22 (old style) - two weeks earlier than planned. When Brusilov asked whether other fronts would attack simultaneously, General Alekseev answered evasively that Evert would be ready by May 28, but in the meantime Brusilov would have to attack on his own.
It must be emphasized that General Brusilov largely inherited Suvorov. One very typical example: before the offensive, he created a copy of the defensive line of the Austro-German fortifications and trained soldiers on it. Suvorov did this more than once. And yet - the Suvorov-like suddenness of the blow inherent in Brusilov. Brusilov paid the main attention to this issue. The disinformation worked: the Austrians did not understand where the Russians would strike the main blow. It never occurred to them that there would be no main strike as such.
The strategic surprise of the Brusilov breakthrough was achieved by the fact that all four armies struck simultaneously. This, as they said then, was against all the rules. But Suvorov also won, breaking all the rules of war (as if there could be any rules in war!).
A day before the offensive, General Alekseev, via direct wire, conveyed to Brusilov the tsar’s order to conduct the offensive not in four sectors, but in one, and with all the forces intended for operations. Brusilov replied: report to the Emperor that I cannot regroup the corps and armies within 24 hours. Then Alekseev very diplomatically remarked: His Majesty is sleeping, I’ll report tomorrow. And tomorrow it was already too late...
And all four armies achieved success!
Brusilov relied not on artillery, as was customary in trench warfare, but on an infantry breakthrough. In the direction of the main attack, an operational density of 3-6 battalions (3000-5000 bayonets) and 15-20 guns per 1 km of front was created with a consumption of 10,000-15,000 shells. In some areas of the breakthrough, the total number of light and heavy guns was brought to 45-50 per 1 km of front. The operational density of enemy troops ranged from 4 to 10 km per infantry division, i.e. 2 battalions per 1 km of front and 10-12 guns. Thus, the Russians managed to obtain a double, and in some areas even a triple superiority of forces.
Another tactical discovery of Brusilov is an attack with rolls. He abandoned the idea of covering long distances in tight formation. The infantry was divided into the so-called. waves that moved one after another at a distance of 150-200 m. The enemy positions should have been attacked in four waves and from close range. The first two waves took a trench and immediately attacked the second, where they tried to gain a foothold. The remaining waves “rolled” over the first ones and with fresh forces took the next line of defense. The cavalry was supposed to be used only in the event of a breakthrough of the enemy front. This method of attack, by the way, like other methods and methods of Brusilov, was widely used in European armies.
The battle began with a surprise artillery barrage by the troops of the Southwestern Front. On the night of June 3-4 (new style), 1916, at 3 a.m., powerful artillery fire was opened, which continued until 9 a.m. In the areas planned for the breakthrough of Russian troops, the enemy's first line of defense was destroyed. Thanks to well-organized reconnaissance, including aerial photography, Russian artillery was able to suppress many of the identified enemy guns.
The front, with the forces of four armies, broke through the Austro-Hungarian defenses simultaneously in 13 sectors and launched an offensive in depth and on the flanks. During the breakthrough, the troops of the Russian Imperial Army broke the Austro-Hungarian defenses stretching from the Pripyat marshes to the Romanian border, advanced 60-150 km in depth and occupied a significant territory of Galicia (present-day Western Ukraine).
Enemy losses amounted to 1.5 million people killed, wounded and captured. The losses of our troops were three times less. And this is in the offensive, where the ratio of losses should be the opposite!
Therefore, the talk that still exists about the low qualities of the commanders of the Russian Imperial Army is a shameless lie. It is enough to compare its losses with the losses of enemies and allies in the First World War, as well as with the losses of the Red Army in 1941–1945. The victory of the Southwestern Front naturally caused an unprecedented triumph in Russia. In his memoirs, German General Erich Ludendorff wrote: “The Russian attack in the Stryi bend, east of Lutsk, was a complete success. The Austro-Hungarian troops were broken through in several places, and the German units that went to the rescue also found themselves in a difficult situation here. It was one of the worst crises on the Eastern Front."
Both the Russian triumph and the German-Austrian crisis are associated with the name of General Alexei Brusilov. Moreover, it is also necessary to recall the names of the commanders of the armies who, under the leadership of an outstanding commander, achieved great success: the commander of the 7th Army D. G. Shcherbachev, the 8th Army - A. M. Kaledin, the 9th Army P. A. Lechitsky , 11th Army - K.V. Sakharov. As a result of this strategic operation, Italy was saved, the French held out at Verdun, the British withstood the onslaught of the Germans on the river. Somme.
It has long been known that the success of the Southwestern Front was not adequately supported by other fronts. But that's another story. As for the results of the offensive of the Southwestern Front, they were stunning and were of utmost importance for the further course of the war and the later reorganization of the world.
Then, in 1916, the Entente countries received all the conditions for a victorious end to the war. Supporting the Brusilov breakthrough with all the forces of the Entente would have led to the defeat of the enemy. This, alas, did not happen - the Allies began to attack only 26 days after the attack by Brusilov’s troops. And the war ended only in 1918. The defeat, as could have been predicted already in 1916, of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Officially, Russia was not among the winners, and justice has not yet been restored. Nevertheless, this battle became a world classic of military art. By the way, I. Stalin had great respect for General Brusilov, whose ideas formed the basis for the largest strategic offensive operations of 1944, which went down in the history of the Great Patriotic War under the name “Stalin’s ten strikes.”
The Brusilov breakthrough is the only military operation named after the commander. Military operations until 1916 did not have code names.
They were usually named after the location where the battles took place. At first, this operation was known as the Lutsk breakthrough. But already from the first days of the fighting, the success of the advancing Russian troops became so obvious that not only the domestic, but also the foreign press started talking about Brusilov. Even in military circles, especially among officers of the Southwestern Front, the offensive was named after General Brusilov. Then this name spread throughout the country. And it has survived to this day. History simply does not give laurels of encouragement to anyone. In 1916, the Southwestern Front carried out the most successful strategic operation of the Entente forces during the entire war. Adjutant General Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov rightfully deserves eternal memory in Russia.
Especially for "Century"
Military action is always a tragedy. First of all, for ordinary soldiers and their families, who may not be able to wait for loved ones from the front. Our country survived two catastrophes - the First World War and the Great Patriotic War, where it played one of the key roles. The Second World War is a separate topic, books are written about it, films and programs are made. The events of the First World War and the role of the Russian Empire in it are not particularly popular among us. Although our soldiers and commanders-in-chief did a lot for the victory of the Entente allied bloc. One of the most important events that changed the course of the war was the Brusilov breakthrough.
A little about General Brusilov
Without exaggeration, the Brusilov breakthrough is the only military operation named after the commander-in-chief. Therefore, it is impossible not to mention this person.
Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov came from a family of hereditary nobles, that is, the origin was the most noble. The future legend of the First World War was born in Tiflis (Georgia) in 1853 in the family of a Russian military leader and a Polish woman. Since childhood, Alyosha dreamed of becoming a military man, and having matured, he fulfilled his dream - he entered the Corps of Pages, then was attached to a dragoon regiment. He was a participant in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878, where he fought bravely. For his exploits on the fronts, the emperor awarded him orders.
Subsequently, Alexey Brusilov becomes squadron commander and switches to teaching. In Russia and abroad he was known as an outstanding rider and an expert in cavalry riding. And it is not surprising that it was precisely such a person who became the turning point that decided the outcome of the war.
Start of the war
Until 1916, the Russian army was not very lucky on the battlefield - the Russian Empire was losing hundreds of thousands of soldiers' lives. General Brusilov participated in the war from the very beginning, taking command of the 8th Army. His operations were quite successful, but it was a drop in the ocean compared to other failures. In general, fierce battles took place in the territories of Western Europe, in which the Russians were defeated - participation in the Battle of Tannenberg and near the Masurian Lakes in 1914-1915 reduced the size of the Russian army. The generals commanding the fronts - Northern, Northwestern and Southwestern (before Brusilov) were not eager to attack the Germans, from whom they had suffered defeats before. A victory was needed. Which we had to wait another whole year.
Note that the Russian army did not have the latest innovations in technology (this was one of the reasons for its defeat in battles). And only by 1916 the situation began to change. Factories began to produce more rifles, and soldiers began to receive improved training and combat techniques. The winter of 1915-1916 was relatively calm for Russian soldiers, so the command decided to improve the situation with training and advanced training.
The attempts were crowned with success - the army entered 1916 much better prepared than at the beginning of the war. The only deficiency was in officers capable of leading - they were killed or captured. Therefore, at the very top, it was decided that Alexey Alekseevich should take command of the southwestern front.
The first operation was not long in coming - the Russian military at the Battle of Verdun tried to push the Germans back to the east. It was a success, and an unexpected one - the German army was surprised by how experienced and armed the Russian army had become. However, success did not last long - soon all weapons and artillery were removed by order of the leadership, and the soldiers were left unprotected before the enemy, who did not fail to take advantage of this. The poison gas attack reduced the Russian army even further. The Western Front retreated. And then the top leadership came up with a decision that should have been made at the beginning of hostilities.
Appointment of Brusilov as commander in chief
In March, Alexey Brusilov replaces General Ivanov (who was criticized for his mismanagement of the army and the failure of military operations).
Alexey Alekseevich advocates an offensive on all three fronts, two of his “colleagues” - Generals Evert and Kuropatkin - prefer to take a wait-and-see and defensive position.
However, Brusilov argued that only a massive attack on the Germans could change the course of the war - they simply physically would not be able to respond in all three directions at once. And then success is guaranteed.
It was not possible to reach full agreement, but it was decided that the Southwestern Front would launch an offensive, and the other two would continue. Brusilov instructed his subordinate officers to develop a precise plan of attack so that not a single detail was missed.
The soldiers knew that they were about to attack a well-defended defensive line. Planted mines, electric fences, barbed wire and much more - this is what greeted the Russian army as a gift from Austria-Hungary.
For complete success, you need to study the area, and Brusilov spent a lot of time making maps to then distribute them to the soldiers. He understood that he had no reserves, neither human nor technical. That is, it’s either all or nothing. There won't be another chance.
Breakthrough
The operation began on June 4. The main idea was to deceive the enemy, who was expecting an attack along the entire length of the front and did not know where exactly the blow would be struck. Thus, Brusilov hoped to confuse the Germans and not give them the opportunity to repel the attack. Machine guns were placed along the entire perimeter of the front, trenches were dug, and roads were laid. Only the highest military officials who were directly in charge of the operation knew about the real location of the strike. The artillery bombardment threw the Austrian army into confusion, and after four days it was forced to retreat.
The main target for Brusilov was the capture of the cities of Lutsk and Kovel (which were later captured by Russian troops). Unfortunately, the actions of other generals Evert and Kuropatkin were not compatible with Brusilov. Therefore, their absence and the maneuvers of General Ludendorff caused big problems for Alexei Alekseevich.
In the end, Evert abandoned the attack and transferred his men to the Brusilov sector. This maneuver was negatively received by the general himself, since he knew that the Germans were monitoring the reshuffle of forces on the fronts and would transfer their soldiers. In the territories controlled by Germany and Austria-Hungary, an established railway network was built, along which German soldiers arrived on the scene before Evert’s army.
In addition, the number of German troops significantly exceeded the Russian army. By August, as a result of bloody battles, the latter lost about 500 thousand people, while the losses of the Germans and Austrians amounted to 375 thousand.
Results
The Brusilov breakthrough is considered one of the bloodiest battles. Over the course of several months of the operation, losses on both sides amounted to millions. The power of the Austro-Hungarian army was undermined. It is difficult to say exactly what the losses were on all sides - German and Russian sources give different figures. But one thing is constant - it was with the Brusilov breakthrough that the streak of success for the bloc and the Russian army in particular began.
Romania, seeing the imminent defeat in the war of the Central Powers, went over to the side of the Entente. Unfortunately, the war continued for another long year and a half and ended only in 1918. There were many more noteworthy battles, but only the Brusilov breakthrough became a turning point, which is talked about even a century later both in Russia and in the West.
What is the Brusilov breakthrough? This is the offensive of the Southwestern Front of the Russian army during the First World War. The offensive operation was carried out against the Austro-German troops from May 22 to September 7, 1916 (all dates are given in the old style). As a result of the offensive, significant defeats were inflicted on Austria-Hungary and Germany. Russian troops occupied Volyn, Bukovina and the eastern regions of Galicia (Volyn, Bukovina and Galicia are historical regions in Eastern Europe). These hostilities are characterized by very high human losses.
This major offensive operation was commanded by the commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, cavalry general Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov. At that time, he also had the retinue rank of adjutant general. The breakthrough was extremely successful, so it was named after the chief strategist. Soviet historians retained this name, since Brusilov went to serve in the Red Army.
It must be said that in 1915 Germany achieved significant successes on the Eastern Front. She won a number of military victories and captured large enemy territories. At the same time, she was unable to completely and irrevocably defeat Russia. And the latter, although it had large losses in manpower and territories, retained the ability to continue military operations. At the same time, the Russian army lost its offensive spirit. To raise it, Russian Emperor Nicholas II assumed the duties of Supreme Commander on August 10, 1915.
Having not achieved a complete victory over Russia, the German command decided in 1916 to deliver the main blows on the Western Front and defeat France. At the end of February 1916, the offensive of German troops began on the flanks of the Verdun ledge. Historians called this operation the “Verdun Meat Grinder.” As a result of stubborn fighting and huge losses, the Germans advanced 6-8 km. This massacre continued until December 1916.
The French command, repelling German attacks, requested help from Russia. And she began the Naroch operation in March 1916. Russian troops went on the offensive in the most difficult conditions of early spring: the soldiers went on the attack knee-deep in snow and melt water. The offensive continued for 2 weeks, and although it was not possible to break through the German defenses, the German offensive in the Verdun area noticeably weakened.
In 1915, another theater of military operations appeared in Europe - the Italian. Italy entered the war on the side of the Entente, and Austria-Hungary turned out to be its enemy. In confrontation with the Austrians, the Italians showed themselves to be weak warriors and also asked for help from Russia. As a result of this, General Brusilov received a telegram on May 11, 1916 from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander. He asked to launch an offensive in order to pull back part of the enemy forces from the Italian front.
Brusilov replied that his Southwestern Front would be ready to launch an offensive on May 19. He also said that an offensive by the Western Front, commanded by Alexey Ermolaevich Evert, was necessary. This offensive was necessary to prevent the transfer of German forces to the south. But the chief of staff said that Evert would only be able to advance on June 1st. In the end, they agreed on the date of Brusilov’s offensive, setting it for May 22.
In general, it should be noted that in the summer of 1916, Russia was planning an offensive, but the Supreme Commander’s headquarters placed its main hopes on the Western Front, and the South-Eastern Front was considered as auxiliary, drawing part of the enemy’s forces onto itself. However, the situation developed in such a way that it was General Brusilov who became the main player on the battlefield, and the rest of the forces took on the role of auxiliary.
The Brusilov breakthrough began in the early morning of May 22 with artillery preparation. The shelling of enemy defensive structures continued for 2 days, and only on May 24, 4 Russian armies went on the offensive. A total of 600 thousand people took part in it. The Austro-Hungarian front was broken through in 13 sectors, and Russian troops moved deep into enemy territory.
The most successful was the offensive of the 8th Army under the command of Alexei Maksimovich Kaledin. After 2 weeks of fighting, he occupied Lutsk, and by mid-June he completely defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army. Kaledin's army advanced 80 km in front and advanced 65 km deep into enemy defenses. Also notable successes were achieved by the 9th Army under the command of Lechitsky Platon Alekseevich. By mid-June, it advanced 50 km and took the city of Chernivtsi. By the end of June, the 9th Army reached operational space and captured the city of Kolomyia, thereby ensuring access to the Carpathians.
And at this time the 8th Army was rushing towards Kovel. 2 German divisions removed from the French front were thrown towards her, and 2 Austrian divisions from the Italian front also arrived. But it did not help. The Russian army pushed the enemy back across the Styr River. Only there did the Austro-German units dig in and begin to repel Russian attacks.
Russian successes inspired the Anglo-French army to launch an offensive on the Somme River. The Allies went on the offensive on July 1. This military operation is notable for the fact that tanks were used for the first time. The bloodbath continued until November 1916. At the same time, the Allies advanced 10 km into the depths of the German defense. The Germans were pushed back from well-fortified positions, and they began to prepare the Hindenburg Line, a system of defensive structures in northeastern France.
At the beginning of July (a month later than planned), the offensive of the Western Front of the Russian army began on Baranovichi and Brest. But the fierce resistance of the Germans could not be broken. Having a triple superiority in manpower, the Russian army was unable to break through the German fortifications. The offensive floundered and did not divert enemy forces from the Southwestern Front. Huge losses and lack of results undermined the morale of the soldiers and officers of the Western Front. In 1917, it was these units that became most susceptible to revolutionary propaganda.
At the end of June, the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Army revised its plans and assigned the main attack to the Southwestern Front under the command of Brusilov. Additional forces were transferred to the south, and the task was set to take Kovel, Brody, Lviv, Monastyriska, Ivano-Frankivsk. To strengthen the Brusilov breakthrough, a Special Army was created under the command of Vladimir Mikhailovich Bezobrazov.
At the end of July, the second stage of the offensive of the Southwestern Front began. As a result of stubborn battles on the right flank, the 3rd, 8th and Special Armies advanced 10 km in 3 days and reached the Stokhod River in its upper reaches. But further attacks ended unsuccessfully. Russian troops failed to break through the German defenses and take Kovel.
The 7th, 11th and 9th armies attacked in the center. They broke through the Austro-German front, but new forces were transferred from other directions to meet them. However, at first this did not save the situation. The Russians took Brody and moved towards Lvov. During the offensive, Monastyriska and Galich were taken. On the left flank, the 9th Army also developed an offensive. She occupied Bukovina and took Ivano-Frankivsk.
Brusilovsky breakthrough on the map
Brusilov focused on the Kovel direction. Throughout August there were stubborn battles there. But the offensive impulse had already faded due to fatigue of personnel and heavy losses. In addition, the resistance of the Austro-German troops intensified every day. The attacks became pointless, and General Brusilov began to be advised to transfer the offensive to the southern flank. But the commander of the Southwestern Front did not heed this advice. As a result, by the beginning of September the Brusilov breakthrough came to naught. The Russian army stopped attacking and went on the defensive.
Summing up the results of the large-scale offensive of the Southwestern Front in the summer of 1916, it can be argued that it was successful. The Russian army pushed the enemy back 80-120 km. Occupied Volyn, Bukovina and part of Galicia. At the same time, the losses of the Southwestern Front amounted to 800 thousand people. But the losses of Germany and Austria-Hungary amounted to 1.2 million people. The breakthrough significantly eased the position of the British and French on the Somme and saved the Italian army from defeat.
Thanks to the successful Russian offensive, Romania entered into an alliance with the Entente in August 1916 and declared war on Austria-Hungary. But by the end of the year the Romanian army was defeated and the country was occupied. But in any case, 1916 demonstrated the superiority of the Entente over Germany and its allies. The latter proposed to make peace at the end of the year, but this proposal was rejected.
And how did Alexey Alekseevich Brusilov himself evaluate his Brusilov breakthrough? He stated that this military operation did not provide any strategic advantage. The Western Front failed the offensive, and the Northern Front did not conduct active combat operations at all. In this situation, the headquarters showed its complete inability to control the Russian armed forces. It did not take advantage of the first successes of the breakthrough and was unable to coordinate the actions of other fronts. They acted at their own discretion, and the result was zero.
But Emperor Nicholas II considered this offensive successful. He awarded General Brusilov with the St. George's weapon with diamonds. However, the St. George's Duma at the Supreme Commander's Headquarters advocated for awarding the general the Order of St. George, 2nd degree. But the sovereign did not agree with such a reward, deciding that it was too high. Therefore, everything was limited to a golden or St. George weapon for bravery.
Southwestern Front offensive 1916,
Brusilovsky breakthrough,
Breakthrough of the Southwestern Front in 1916
Breakthrough of the Austro-German front in 1916
The fighting in the Eastern European theater of the First World War in the 1916 campaign was marked by such a major event as the offensive operation of the Russian Southwestern Front under the command of General A.A. Brusilova .
The general plan of operations of the Russian army for the summer campaign of 1916 was developed by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief Headquarters on the basis of strategic decisions made by the Allies in March 1916 in Chantilly. He proceeded from the fact that a decisive offensive could only be launched north of Polesie, that is, by the troops of the Northern and Western Fronts. The Southwestern Front was given a defensive mission. But at the military council on April 14, 1916, held in Mogilev, Brusilov insisted that his front also take part in the offensive.
“According to the plan of the inter-allied conference, the Russian army was supposed to go on the offensive on June 15. However, due to the resumption of German attacks near Verdun and the offensive of the Austro-Hungarian army against the Italians in the Trentino region that began on May 15, the French and Italians persistently demanded that the Russian command take decisive action in a more early deadlines, and it (the command) once again met them halfway.
The Southwestern Front received the task of diverting the forces of the Austro-German troops to ensure the offensive of the Western Front, to which the Headquarters assigned the main role in the general offensive of all three fronts. By the beginning of the offensive, the front consisted of four armies (8th General A.M. Kaledin, 11th General V.V. Sakharov, 7th General D.G. Shcherbachev, 9th General P.A. Lechitsky) and occupied a strip 480 km wide south of Polesie and to the border with Romania.
The army group of Linsengen, the army group of E. Boehm-Ermoli, the Southern Army and the 7th Army of Planzer-Baltin acted against these troops. (Rostunov I.I. Russian Front of the First World War. M., 1976. P. 290.) The Austro-Hungarians strengthened their defense for 9 months. It was well prepared and consisted of two, and in some places three defensive positions, 3-5 km from one another, each position consisted of two or three lines of trenches and resistance nodes and had a depth of 1.5-2 km. The positions were equipped with concrete dugouts and were covered by several strips of barbed wire. In the Austrian trenches, a new product awaited the Russians - flamethrowers, and in the forefield - land mines.
The Southwestern Front's preparations for the offensive were particularly thorough. As a result of the painstaking work of the front commander, army commanders and their headquarters, a clear operation plan was drawn up.
The right-flank 8th Army delivered the main blow in the Lutsk direction.
The rest of the armies had to solve auxiliary tasks. The immediate goal of the fighting was to defeat the opposing Austro-Hungarian troops and capture their fortified positions.
The strictest adherence to camouflage measures and the secrecy of all preparations for such a powerful offensive made it unexpected for the enemy. In general terms, its leadership knew about the Russian grouping; intelligence obtained information about the impending attack. But the high military command of the Central Bloc powers, convinced of the inability of the Russian troops to take offensive action after the defeats of 1915, rejected the emerging threat.
“In the early warm morning of June 4, 1916, May 22, old style, the Austrian troops, buried in front of the Russian Southwestern Front, did not see the sun rise,” writes the historian. “Instead of the sun’s rays from the east, dazzling and blinding death - thousands of shells turned habitable , strongly fortified positions in hell... That morning something unheard of and unprecedented in the annals of a dull, bloody, positional war happened. Almost along the entire length of the Southwestern Front, the attack was a success.” (Yakovlev N.N. The Last War of Old Russia. M., 1994. P. 169.)
This first, stunning success was achieved thanks to the close cooperation of infantry and artillery.
Russian artillerymen once again demonstrated their superiority to the whole world. Artillery preparation on various sectors of the front lasted from 6 to 45 hours. The Austrians experienced all types of Russian artillery fire and even received their share of chemical shells. “The earth shook. Three-inch shells flew with a howl and whistle, and with a dull groan, heavy explosions merged into one terrible symphony.” (Semanov S.N. Makarov. Brusilov. M., 1989. P. 515.)
The most successful breakthrough was carried out on the right flank, in the offensive zone of the 8th Army of General Kaledin, which operated in the Lutsk direction. Lutsk was taken already on the third day of the offensive, and on the tenth day the army troops went 60 km deep into the enemy’s position and reached the river. Stokhod. During this phase of the operation, Kovel was never captured by the Russians. The Austro-Germans managed to stabilize the front. Due to the miscalculations of the Headquarters, the lack of will and inactivity of the commanders of the Western and Northern Fronts, the brilliant operation of the Southwestern Front did not receive the conclusion that could have been expected. But she played a big role during the 1916 campaign. The Austro-Hungarian army suffered a crushing defeat. Its losses amounted to about 1.5 million killed and wounded and turned out to be irreparable.
The Russian army, having conquered 25 thousand square meters. km, returned part of Galicia and all of Bukovina. The Entente received invaluable benefits from her victory. To stop the Russian offensive, from June 30 to early September 1916, the Germans transferred at least 16 divisions from the Western Front, the Austro-Hungarians curtailed their offensive against the Italians and sent 7 divisions to Galicia, the Turks - 2 divisions. (See: Harbottle T. Battles of World History. Dictionary. M., 1993. P. 217.) The success of the operation of the Southwestern Front predetermined the entry of Romania into the war on the side of the Entente on August 28, 1916.
Despite its incompleteness, this operation represents an outstanding achievement of military art, which is not denied by foreign authors. They pay tribute to the talent of the Russian general. "Brusilovsky breakthrough" is the only battle of the First World War, the name of which appears in the title of the commander.
Materials used from the book: “One Hundred Great Battles”, M. “Veche”, 2002
From the encyclopedia:
Southwestern Front offensive 1916, Brusidovsky breakthrough, Southwestern Front breakthrough 1916, Austro-German Front offensive 1916, offensive. operation of the South-West troops. front (command-general of the cavalry A.A. Brusilov, chief of staff - general-l. V.N. Klembovsky), carried out from May 22 (June 4) to the end of July (beginning of August) during 1 1st World War 1914-1918. According to the decision of the military. conference of the Entente powers in Chantilly (March 1916) on the general offensive of the allied armies in the summer of 1916 Russian. the command planned to launch a major offensive in mid-June. According to the 1916 campaign plan, approved at a meeting of front commanders at Headquarters (Mogilev) April 1 (14), ch. the attack was to be carried out by the Western troops. front (1st, 2nd, 4th, 10th and 3rd armies) in the Vilna direction. South-West (8th, 11th, 7th and 9th Armies) and Northern. (12th, 5th and 6th Armies) the fronts were assigned a supporting role. According to the Headquarters directive dated April 11(24). South-West the front was supposed to assist the West. front offensive from the Rivne region to Lutsk. Application of ch. the attack on Lutsk was assigned to the 8th Army, as the closest to the West. to the front. The command of the Southwestern Front carried out comprehensive preparations for the offensive: special attention was paid to thorough (including aerial) reconnaissance of the defense of the pr-ka, engineer. preparing bridgeheads for the offensive (each with 6-8 parallel trenches), training troops to overcome sections of positions similar to the Austro-German ones (2-3 fortified zones), practicing the interaction of infantry with artillery. The offensive was prepared in the strictest secrecy. The issue of breaking through the Austro-German positional front was resolved in a new way. defense In contrast to that adopted in the Anglo-French. troops practice breaking through defenses in one sector (direction), Brusilov prepared a breakthrough in the stripes of all armies of the front at the same time, i.e. in four directions. This achieved oper. masking ch. strike and maneuver with reserves was excluded in Ch. direction of attack. South-West the front had a slight superiority over the Austro-German armies (4th, 1st, 2nd, Southern and 7th) in manpower (573 thousand bayonets versus 448 thousand) and light artillery (1770 versus 1301 op.), but in heavy art it was more than three times inferior to pr (168 versus 545 op.). Superiority in forces and means was created in the areas where armies broke through: in infantry - by 2-2.5 times, in artillery - by 1.5 - 1.7 times. The front reserve consisted of St. 5 infantry divisions (including the 5th Siberian Corps, transferred by Headquarters before the offensive). These forces were clearly not enough to develop success. Due to the heavy defeat of Italy. army in Trentino (May 1916) and the allies’ appeal to Russia with a request to speed up the start of the offensive to divert troops from the Italian army. Front Headquarters decided to launch an offensive in the South-West. front 2 weeks earlier than planned. term. S.-W. f. n. began on May 22 (June 4) with a strong and effective art for that time. preparation. The greatest success was achieved in the zone of the 8th Army (command, General A. M. Kaledin) in the Lutsk direction. Having broken through the front in the 16-km section of Nosovichi, Koryto (the so-called Lutsk breakthrough), by May 25 (June 7) it expanded the breakthrough along the front to 70-80 km, to a depth of 25-35 km and occupied Lutsk. By June 2 (15), the 8th Army defeated the 4th Austro-Hungarian Army. the army of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand from the Armenian army. gene groups A. Linsingen and advanced to a depth of 65-75 km. Having exhausted its reserves and encountered stubborn resistance in the Kiselin region from the Germans and troops transferred from France and other sectors of the front, it suspended its advance. This was also done because its offensive was not supported by the neighboring 3rd Army of the West. front. From June 3 (16) to June 22 (July 5), the 8th Army repelled counterattacks by army groups of General. G. Marwitz, E. Fankelhain and F. Bernhardi. June 11(24) South-West. The 3rd Army was transferred to the front. Troops of the 8th and 3rd armies (commands, General L.P. Lesh) tried to cross the river. Stokhod and captured Kovel, but failed, because the Germans, having brought up large forces, created a powerful defense unit here. The 11th Army (commanded by General V.V. Sakharov) broke through the front at Sapanov, but due to the lack of reserves it could not develop the breakthrough. The 7th Army (command, General D.G. Shcherbachev) broke through the defenses in the 7-km sector in the Yazlovets region, but counterattacks by large forces from the Army. gene groups Bem-Ermolli and Yuzh. army general Bothmer stopped the development of the offensive. The operation of the 9th Army (command, General Ts. A. Lechitsky) was successfully deployed. Having broken through the front in the 11-km section of Onut, Dobronouc, it defeated the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army and occupied Chernivtsi on June 5 (18). Successful breakthrough of the South-West. front was not supported in a timely manner by other fronts. The headquarters turned out to be unable to organize the interaction of the fronts. The Western offensive scheduled for May 27-28 (June 10-11). front was initially postponed, but. then it began twice - on June 2 (15) and June 20-26 (July 3-9), but was carried out hesitantly and ended in complete failure. The situation urgently required the transfer of chapter. strike from the rear to the southwest direction, but the Headquarters made a decision on this only on June 26 (July 9), when the Germans had already managed to concentrate large forces here. Two offensives launched during July against the heavily fortified fortifications. Kovel, in which the strategist also participated, the reserve of the Headquarters - Special Army General. V. M. Bezobrazov (3 corps), resulted in protracted bloody battles on the river. Stokhod, where the front stabilized. The 11th Army occupied Brody. The offensive of the 9th Army developed most successfully; during July it cleared all of Bukovina and South. Galicia. By the beginning of August, the front had stabilized along the river line. Stokhod, Kiselin, Zolochev, Berezhany, Galich, Stanislav, Delyatin. S.-W. f. n. was a major front-line operation, which was of great importance in the overall course of the war, although the operation. the successes of the front troops (breakthrough of the defense in a zone of 550 km, to a depth of 60-150 km) and did not lead to decisive strategic results. Austro-German troops lost up to 1.5 million people in May - July. killed, wounded and prisoners, 581 guns, 1,795 machine guns, 448 bombs and mortars. Russian losses armies amounted to approx. 500 thousand people The forces of Austria-Hungary were seriously undermined. To stop the advance of Russian. troops, the Germans were forced to transfer from the West. and Italy. Frontov St. 30 infantry and more than 3 kav. divisions, it eased the position of the French at Verdun and forced the Germans to stop the offensive in Trentino (see Verdun operation 1916, Trentino operation 1916). Important political as a result of S.-W. f. n. was the acceleration of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. monarchy and the performance of Romania on the side of the Entente (Romanian Front). Along with the Battle of the Somme, South-West. f. n. marked the beginning of a turning point during the 1st World War. From a military point of view. lawsuit, South-West f. n. marked the emergence of a new form of front breakthrough (simultaneously in several sectors), put forward by Brusilov, which was developed in the last years of World War I, especially in the 1918 campaign in Western Europe. military theater actions.
V. A. Yemets.
Soviet military encyclopedia: In the 8th volume / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko (prev.) and others - M., 1976. -T.I. -WITH. 605-606.
Literature
Brusilov A.A. My memories. - M.-L., 1929.
Brusilov A. A. My memories. M., 1963.
Vetoshnikov L.V. Brusilovsky breakthrough. M., 1940.
Domank A. On the left flank of the Brusilov breakthrough // Border Guard. - 1994. -No. 8.-S. 67-75.
Zayonchkovsky A. M. World War 1914-1918. Ed. 3rd. T. 2. M., 1938;
History of the First World War. 1914-1918. T. 2. M., 1975;
World War 1914-1918. "Lutsk breakthrough". M., 1924;
The offensive of the Southwestern Front in May-June 1916. M., 1940;
Rostunov I.I. General Brusilov. - M., 1964.
Rostunov I.I. Russian front of the First World War. M., 1976;
Soviet military encyclopedia: In the 8th volume / Ch. ed. commission A.A. Grechko (prev.) and others - M., 1976. -T.I. -WITH. 605-606.
Strategic outline of the war of 1914-1918. Part 6. M., 1923;
100 years ago, on June 4, 1916, the offensive of the Russian armies of the Southwestern Front against the Austro-German troops began. This operation became known as the Brusilovsky breakthrough, and is also known as the Lutsk breakthrough and the 4th Battle of Galicia. This battle became the most memorable for Russia in the First World War, as Russian troops in Galicia under the command of General Alexei Brusilov broke through the defenses of the Austro-German troops and rapidly advanced. In the very first days of the operation, the number of prisoners reached tens of thousands. The opportunity arose to withdraw the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the war. After the severe setbacks of the 1915 campaign, this operation temporarily strengthened the army's morale. The operation of Russian troops lasted from May 22 (June 4) until the end of August 1916.
The successful actions of the Southwestern Front were not supported by other fronts. The headquarters turned out to be unable to organize the interaction of the fronts. Command errors also had an impact at the level of the command of the Southwestern Front and the command of the front armies. As a result, the Lutsk breakthrough did not lead to the fall of the enemy front and a major strategic success leading to victory in the war. However, the operation in Galicia was of great importance. The Austro-Germans lost up to 1.5 million people in May-August 1916, of which up to 400 thousand were prisoners (however, Russian troops suffered heavy losses in May-June alone, 600 thousand people). The strength of the Austro-Hungarian military machine, which had already suffered a terrible defeat during the 1914 campaign and was able to more or less recover in 1915, was completely undermined. Until the end of the war, the Austro-Hungarian Empire was no longer able to conduct active military operations without the support of German troops. In the Habsburg monarchy itself, the processes of disintegration sharply intensified.
To stop the advance of the Russian army, the German command had to transfer 11 divisions from the Western Front to the Eastern Front, and the Austrians had to remove 6 divisions from the Italian Front. This contributed to the weakening of the pressure of the German army in the Verdun area and the overall victory of the Allied forces in the Battle of Verdun. The Austrian command was forced to stop the Trentino operation and significantly strengthen the army group in Galicia. The operation of the Southwestern Front was a major achievement of military art, proving the possibility of breaking through the enemy's strong positional defenses. Romania, which in 1914-1915 waited, expecting a major success for one of the parties in the Great War, took the side of the Entente, which scattered the forces of the Central Powers. The Lutsk breakthrough, along with the Battle of Verdun and the Battle of the Somme, marked the beginning of a strategic turn in the course of the world war in favor of the Entente, forcing the Central Powers to switch to strategic defense in 1917.
As a result, this battle will go down in official historiography as the “Brusilov breakthrough” - this was a unique case when the battle was named not by geographical (for example, the Battle of Kalka, the Battle of Kulikovo or the Erzurum operation) or other related characteristics, but by the name of the commander. Although contemporaries knew the operation as the Lutsk breakthrough and the 4th Battle of Galicia, which was in accordance with the historical tradition of naming the battle after the location of the battle. However, the press, predominantly liberal, began to praise Brusilov, as they did not praise other successful commanders of the Great War (like Yudenich, who inflicted severe defeats on the Turkish army several times in the Caucasus). In Soviet historiography, given the fact that Brusilov went over to the side of the Reds, this name stuck.
Plan for the 1916 campaign
In accordance with the decision of the conference of the Entente powers in Chantilly (March 1916) on the general offensive of the allied armies in the summer of 1916, the Russian Headquarters decided to launch an offensive on the Eastern Front in June. In its calculations, the Russian Headquarters proceeded from the balance of forces on the Eastern Front. On the Russian side there were three fronts: Northern, Western and Southwestern. Kuropatkin's northern front (chief of staff Sivers) covered the St. Petersburg direction and consisted of the 12th, 5th and 6th armies. The front headquarters was located in Pskov. They were opposed by the 8th German Army and part of Scholz's army group. Evert's Western Front defended the Moscow direction. It included the 1st, 2nd, 10th and 3rd armies (the 4th army was added in May). The front headquarters is in Minsk. The Russian troops were opposed by part of the Scholz army group, the 10th, 12th and 9th and part of the Linsingen army group. Brusilov's Southwestern Front covered the Kiev direction and included the 8th, 11th, 7th and 9th armies. Front headquarters - Berdichev. The Linsingen army group, the Böhm-Ermoli army group, the Southern Army and the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army acted against these troops. According to Alekseev, on three Russian fronts there were more than 1.7 million bayonets and sabers against over 1 million people from the enemy. The Northern and Western Fronts had a particularly great advantage: 1.2 million people against 620 thousand Germans. The Southwestern Front had 500 thousand people against 440 thousand Austro-Germans.
Thus, according to the Russian command, on the northern sector of the front, Russian troops had double superiority over the enemy. This advantage could be seriously increased after the units were recruited to full strength and reserves were transferred. Therefore, Alekseev intended to launch a decisive offensive in the sector just north of Polesie, with the forces of the Northern and Western fronts. The strike groups of the two fronts were to advance in the general direction of Vilna. The Southwestern Front was given a defensive mission. Brusilov had only to prepare for a strike from the Rivne region in the direction of Kovel if the offensive in the north was successful.
Alekseev believed that it was necessary to seize the strategic initiative into one’s own hands and prevent the enemy from going on the offensive first. He believed that after the failure at Verdun, the Germans would again turn their attention to the Eastern Theater and launch a decisive offensive as soon as the weather permitted. As a result, the Russian army had to either give the initiative to the enemy and prepare for defense, or forestall him and attack. At the same time, Alekseev noted the negative consequences of the defensive strategy: our forces were stretched along a 1200-kilometer front (the Anglo-French defended only 700 km and could concentrate a larger number of forces and means without fear of enemy attacks); the underdeveloped communications network did not allow the rapid transfer of reserves in the required quantities. In Alekseev’s opinion, it was necessary to launch an offensive in May in order to forestall enemy actions.
However, the March failure (Naroch operation) had a catastrophic effect on the commanders-in-chief of the Northern and Western Fronts - Alexei Kuropatkin and Alexei Evert. Any decisive offensive seemed unthinkable to them. At a meeting at Headquarters on April 1 (14), Generals Kuropatkin and Evert spoke out for complete passivity; given the technical state of our army, our offensive should, in their opinion, end in failure. However, the new commander-in-chief of the Southwestern Front, Alexei Brusilov, believed in the Russian troops and demanded an offensive mission for his front, vouching for victory.
According to the plan approved by Headquarters on April 11 (24), the main blow was delivered by troops of the Western Front in the Vilna direction. Auxiliary strikes were carried out by the Northern Front from the Dvinsk region to Novo-Alexandrovsk and further to Vilno, and by the Southwestern Front in the Lutsk direction. In connection with the difficult situation on the Italian front, where Austro-Hungarian troops launched the Trentino operation in May 1916 and threatened to break through the front and withdraw Italy from the Entente camp, the allies turned to Russia with an urgent request to speed up the start of the offensive in order to pull enemy troops from the Italian directions. As a result, the Russian Headquarters decided to launch an offensive earlier than planned.
Thus, instead of two main blows by the forces of the Northern and Western Fronts, it was decided to deliver a decisive blow by the forces of only one - the Western Front. The Northern Front supported this offensive with an auxiliary strike. The task of the Southwestern Front, which was supposed to deliver an auxiliary attack on Lutsk and thereby facilitate the actions of the Western Front troops in the main direction, changed significantly.
The offensive operation was different in that it did not provide for the depth of the operation. The troops were supposed to break through the enemy’s defenses and inflict damage on them; the development of the operation was not envisaged. It was believed that after overcoming the first line of defense, a second operation to break through the second line would be prepared and carried out. The Russian high command, taking into account the French and its own experience, did not believe in the possibility of breaking through the enemy’s defenses with one blow. To break through the second line of defense, a new operation was required.
Preparing the operation
After the General Headquarters adopted the plan of operation for the 1916 campaign, the fronts began preparing a strategic offensive. April and most of May were spent preparing for a decisive offensive. As military historian A. A. Kersnovsky noted: “The training camps of the Northern Front were baggy. Kuropatkin hesitated, doubted, losing his spirit. In all his orders there was an unfounded fear of a German landing in Livonia - to the rear of the Northern Front.” As a result, Kuropatkin constantly asked for reinforcements and sent all the troops (in total 6 infantry and 2 cavalry divisions) to guard the Baltic Sea coast. Thus, he weakened the strike group, which was supposed to support the main attack of the Western Front.
A similar situation was on Evert's Western Front, whose troops were to play a major role in the operation. Evert could not be accused of poor work; he carried out titanic paperwork, literally bombarded the troops with countless orders, instructions, instructions, trying to provide for literally every little detail. The command of the Russian Western Front was guided by the experience of the French Front, but it could not create its own, or find a way out of the strategic impasse of positional warfare. As a result, behind the bustle of the headquarters of the Western Front, there was a sense of uncertainty in their strength, and the troops felt it. Evert concentrated 12 corps of the 2nd and 4th armies of Smirnov and Ragoza to attack Vilna in the Molodechensk region - 480 thousand soldiers against 80 thousand Germans. In addition, behind them in the second line, in the reserve of the Headquarters there were 4 corps (including the 1st and 2nd Guards, Guards Cavalry Corps). However, it seemed to the commander-in-chief that this was not enough. And the closer the deadline for the start of the offensive on May 18 approached, the more disheartened Evert became. At the last moment, when the operation was already prepared, he suddenly changed the entire plan and, instead of attacking Vilna, chose an attack on Baranovichi, transferring the headquarters of the 4th Army to a new direction. He demanded a delay to prepare a new strike - from May 18 to May 31. And he immediately asked for a new extension - until June 4. This angered even the calm Alekseev and he ordered an attack.
The best preparations for the offensive were carried out on the Southwestern Front. When Commander-in-Chief Ivanov surrendered the front to Brusilov, he described his armies as “unfit for combat,” and called the offensive in Galicia and Volyn “hopeless.” However, Brusilov was able to reverse this unfavorable trend and instill confidence in the troops in their abilities. True, Kaledin and Sakharov (8th and 11th armies) did not expect anything good from the operation, Shcherbachev and Lechitsky (7th and 9th armies) showed skepticism. However, everyone set to work energetically.
Brusilov's idea, which formed the basis of the front's offensive plan, was completely new and seemed adventurous. Before the start of the war, the best form of offensive was considered to be bypassing one or two flanks of the enemy in order to encircle him. This forced the enemy to retreat or led to complete or partial encirclement. Positional warfare with a solid front well prepared for defense buried this method. Now we had to break through the enemy’s defenses with a powerful frontal attack and suffer huge losses. Having fully taken into account the experience of the failed offensive and attempts to break through the positional front on the French and Russian fronts, the commander-in-chief refused to concentrate the strike force in one place, which was always identified in advance by the enemy, and demanded that an offensive be prepared along the entire front in order to mislead the enemy. Brusilov ordered each army and some corps to select a breakthrough site and immediately begin engineering work to approach the enemy. For the same reason, artillery preparation was reduced to ensure surprise of the attack. Each army commander had to attack in the direction he himself chose. As a result, the front did not deliver one concentrated blow, but launched 20-30 attacks in different places. The Austro-German command was deprived of the opportunity to determine the location of the main attack and concentrate artillery, additional troops and reserves here.
This method of breaking through the enemy front had not only advantages, but also serious disadvantages. It was impossible to concentrate such an amount of forces and resources on the direction of the main attack that would have made it possible to develop the first success. Brusilov himself understood this well. “Every course of action,” he wrote, “has its downside, and I believed that it was necessary to choose the course of action that is most beneficial for a given case, and not blindly imitate the Germans.” “... It can easily happen,” he noted, “that at the site of the main attack we may receive little or no success, but since the enemy is attacked by us, greater success may appear where we do not currently expect it.” . These bold ideas confused the high command. Alekseev tried to object, but as usual, without much energy, in the end, having received a rebuff from his subordinate, he resigned himself.
General Brusilov assigned the main role to his right flank - Kaledin's 8th Army, as adjacent to the Western Front, which was supposed to deliver the main blow to the enemy. Brusilov always remembered that he was solving an auxiliary problem, that the role of his front was secondary, and subordinated his calculations to the plan developed at Headquarters. As a result, the main direction of the Southwestern Front, Lvov, where the 11th Army was located, was sacrificed. A third of the infantry (13 divisions out of 38.5) and half of the heavy artillery (19 batteries out of 39) of the entire front were sent to the 8th Army. Kaledin's armies pointed in the direction of Kovel-Brest. Kaledin himself decided to deliver the main blow with his left flank in the Lutsk direction, with well-trained troops of the 8th and 40th corps.
In the 11th Army, General Sakharov planned a breakthrough from Tarnopol in the sector of his left flank 6th Corps. The 7th Army of General Shcherbachev, against which the strongest section of the Austro-German front was located, was the weakest and consisted of only 7 divisions. Therefore, Shcherbachev decided to break through the enemy defenses where it was easiest, in the sector of the left flank of the 2nd Corps at Yazlovets. In the 9th Army, Lechitsky decided to first defeat the enemy in Bukovina, so he struck with his left flank - the reinforced 11th Corps, in a southwestern direction, towards the Carpathians. Then, having secured the left flank, he planned to transfer the attack to the right flank, in Transnistria.
Thus, the Southwestern Front planned four battles, not counting the diversionary and auxiliary actions of other corps. Each army commander chose the direction for his attack, regardless of his neighbors. All four armies attacked with their left flanks. What was especially bad was that the 8th and 11th armies operated in discord. Sakharov's 11th Army, in theory, was supposed to activate its right flank, facilitating the main attack of the 8th Army on Lutsk. Instead, Sakharov directed all his efforts to the left flank, and the right-flank 17th Corps had the task only of demonstrating the offensive. With normal coordination of the actions of the 8th and 11th Army, the breakthrough of the enemy front could have been more impressive.
However, the headquarters of the Southwestern Front did not set out to link together the actions of four armies, or even two - the 8th and 11th. After all, the main battle in the southwestern strategic direction was not at all included in the calculations of the Russian Headquarters, even as a plan “B” if the offensive of the Western Front failed. The main role in the strategic offensive was assigned to the Western Front. Brusilov’s front was only supposed to “demonstrate.” Therefore, Brusilov planned several battles, hoping to distract and pin down the Austro-German forces with numerous blows. The development of the offensive, in the event of a breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses, was simply not envisaged, except for the Lutsk direction in the 8th Army, and then depending on the success of the Western Front. Brusilov had only one corps in reserve.
The preparation for breaking through the enemy defense itself was carried out perfectly by Brusilov’s armies. The headquarters of the 8th Army organized the “fist of fire” well, and the headquarters of the 7th Army carefully prepared the infantry assault. Our aviation photographed enemy positions along the entire front of the South German Army. Based on these photographs, the headquarters of the 7th Army drew up detailed plans, where they included all the fortifications, communication passages and machine gun nests. In the rear of the 7th Army, training camps were even erected, where they reproduced the enemy defense areas planned for the assault. The troops trained in such a way that they would then feel at enemy positions as if they were at home. Huge earthworks etc. were carried out.
