Studio      01/17/2024

Isoroku Yamamoto - Marshal of Japan, Admiral of the Fleet. Biography Appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet

Born on April 4, 1884, Isoroku Yamamoto's hometown was Nagaoka, located in Niigata Prefecture. The future admiral came from the family of a poor samurai. Since childhood, the boy dreamed of serving on a ship and, having matured, entered the Isoroku Yamamoto Academy and received his education in 1904, when the Russo-Japanese War began.

Start of service

At the beginning of the armed confrontation, the sailor ended up on the armored cruiser Nissin, which took part in the Battle of Tsushima. In that battle, on May 28, 1905, the Japanese defeated the 2nd squadron of the Pacific Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Zinovy ​​​​Rozhdestvensky. A significant number of Russian ships were sunk. It was that battle that became the culmination of the war. For Isoroku Yamamoto, the victory came at a high price. He was injured, losing his middle and index fingers.

Continuation of military career

Despite the injury, Yamamoto’s service not only continued, but increased. He entered the Naval War College, which trained the cadres of the high command of the fleet. The officer graduated at the age of 30, and at the age of 32 (in 1916) he became a lieutenant commander. But Isoroku Yamamoto did not stop there. In 1919-1921 He received his education abroad, attending the American Harvard University.

Yamamoto served twice as a naval attaché in Washington. Life in the New World affected his political views. At that time, the military man established himself as a supporter of the peaceful resolution of any world conflicts and a strong opponent of the war against the United States. In 1923 he was promoted to captain.

New challenges

At the age of 40, the future Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto became interested in naval aviation, preferring it to his previous specialization in naval artillery. First, he tried his hand at commanding the cruiser Isuzu, and then the aircraft carrier Akagi. Seeing the future of the army and navy, he also headed the aeronautics department.

During the break between the two world wars, Japan, along with other influential powers, tried to follow a course of disarmament. In order to develop general measures in this area, maritime conferences were convened in London twice (in 1930 and 1934). Yamamoto, who became a vice admiral, participated in them as a career military man accompanying Japanese diplomats.

Despite these pacifist gestures, the government in Tokyo gradually worsened the situation in the Far East. In 1931, Manchuria was invaded, in 1937, war with China began, and in 1940, Japan signed an alliance pact with Germany and Italy. Isoroku Yamamoto, whose photographs then began to often appear in the Western press, consistently opposed the militaristic decisions of his authorities. Supporters of the war (of which there were significantly more) harshly criticized the vice admiral.

Appointment as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet

In 1940, Isoroku Yamamoto, whose quotes from speeches in the fleet were passed from mouth to mouth, received the rank of admiral and became commander-in-chief of the United Fleet. At the same time, the military man continued to receive threats from Japanese nationalists, who considered him a traitor to the interests of his homeland. In 1941, a militarist became prime minister. It seemed that Yamamoto’s career was in the balance. The Admiral was perhaps Tojo's main hardware opponent.

However, despite everything, Yamamoto managed to maintain his ranks and position. His widespread popularity among his subordinates affected him (both officers and sailors treated him with boundless respect). In addition, the admiral had a personal friendship with Emperor Hirohito. Finally, Isoroku Yamamoto, whose quotations from theoretical works became the bible for the entire fleet, was one of the most competent people in the entire armed forces. Having a Western education and unique work experience, only he could consistently carry out the ongoing reform of Japan's naval armada.

Conflict with the militarists

The Tojo government that came to power began preparing a war against the United States of America. Yamamoto was skeptical about a possible conflict with the United States. He believed that it would not be enough for Japan to defeat the enemy in the Pacific by capturing the Philippines, Guam, Hawaii and other islands. The war with America was supposed to end only after Washington's surrender. The admiral did not believe that Japan had enough resources for such a forced march and, as subsequent developments showed, he was right.

Nevertheless, while remaining in his position as commander-in-chief of the fleet, Yamamoto took part in the preparations for the imminent campaign. With his direct participation, preparations were underway for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The admiral opposed Kantai Kessen, a strategic doctrine according to which Japan was supposed to fight the war with the United States in a defensive position. Yamamoto, on the contrary, believed that his country had only one opportunity to defeat the States - to shock the American public with a lightning offensive and force politicians to immediately sign peace.

Preparing for war

Since the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried out using aircraft, special attention should have been paid to the development of aviation. This is what Isoroku Yamamoto did. The film "Attack on Pearl Harbor" clearly demonstrates his contribution to the success of that operation. The admiral also took care of aviation operating in coastal operations. Under his patronage, the development of the G3M bomber and G4M torpedo bomber was carried out. These models were distinguished by an increased flight range, which gave the Japanese command an additional significant advantage. The Americans called the G4M a “flying lighter.”

Yamamoto Isoroku, whose biography was largely connected with aircraft, raised the task of creating a new long-range fighter. It was the A6M Zero model, which received a significantly lightweight design. The admiral initiated the reorganization of aviation and the formation of a new First Air Fleet. It was this formation that took part in the attack on Pearl Harbor. In preparing the operation, Yamamoto hoped for the element of surprise. A surprise attack would give the Japanese a few more months of freedom in the Pacific until the American fleet arrived.

Pearl Harbor

On December 7, 1941, 6 Japanese aircraft carriers, carrying about 400 aircraft, approached Pearl Harbor. An attack followed, as a result of which 4 battleships and another 11 large ships of another type were sunk. Many auxiliary and secondary vessels were also destroyed. The Japanese lost only 29 crews.

Although the successful attack was planned by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, Isoroku Yamamoto, it was carried out by Chuichi Nagumo. It was this vice admiral, fearing too many losses, who ordered the planes to retreat. Yamamoto criticized this decision. He accused Nagumo of failing to complete important tasks: bombing the American military infrastructure on the island of Oahu and destroying enemy aircraft carriers that were absent in the harbor. The vice admiral, however, was not punished in any way. The country's authorities were pleased with the result of the unexpected raid.

Continuation of the campaign

After the events in Hawaii, the Japanese military continued to implement the empire's strategic plan. Further battles were led by Jisaburo Ozawa, Ibo Takahashi and Nobutake Kondo. They were all subordinates of Isoroku Yamamoto. The short biography of this military leader is an example of a naval commander who had to carry out a task of incredible scale.

The Japanese made it their goal to subjugate all the Pacific islands. Yamamoto developed a plan in which the navy and air force would destroy numerous British and Dutch bases. The main battles took place over the East Indies (modern Indonesia) that belonged to the Netherlands.

First of all, the Japanese occupied the north of the Malay Archipelago. Then in February 1942 came the Battle of the Java Sea. The Japanese fleet defeated the combined fleet of the United States, the Netherlands, Australia and England. This success allowed the complete occupation of the Dutch East Indies. A little later, American resistance in the Philippines was localized.

Debates about the future

The successes of Japanese weapons did not embarrass the Allies. Neither Great Britain nor the United States were going to agree to peace. Tokyo took a break in order to decide in which direction to move next. Most military leaders advocated an offensive in Burma and access through it to India, where, with the help of local nationalists, they planned to overthrow the British metropolis. Admiral Yamamoto, however, had the opposite opinion. He proposed attacking the remaining American positions in the Pacific Islands.

The 2011 film “Isoroku Yamamoto” (another title is “The Attack on Pearl Harbor”) clearly shows what an unyielding character the admiral had. So this time he did not give up his point of view. During one of the discussions, Tokyo headquarters was bombed by American aircraft. This incident forced the Japanese command to reconsider their plans. Soon, Yamamoto's idea of ​​attacking Midway Island formed the basis of the strategy for the new stage of the war. The admiral was appointed commander-in-chief in the upcoming operation.

Midway operation

According to Yamamoto's plan, the Japanese fleet was to be divided into two parts. He was going to send one group to the shores of Alaska to distract the Americans, and the second to attack Midway Atoll. The operation was carefully prepared. It seemed that the admiral had thought of all the details. If everything had gone according to his plan, the Japanese would have gained a significant superiority in forces at the decisive moment and defeated the Americans piecemeal.

However, the events on the eve of the Battle of Midway dashed all Yamamoto’s hopes. American intelligence was able to decipher the secret Japanese code used to transmit secret data. The success of cryptographers gave the enemy a colossal advantage.

When the Battle of Midway began on June 4, 1942, American ships unexpectedly evaded all Japanese attacks and organized their own ambush. In the decisive battle, 248 aircraft and 4 aircraft carriers of Yamamoto were destroyed. Although the Japanese pilots took off, they were able to sink only one enemy ship (Yorktown). The admiral, realizing that the battle was lost, ordered the remaining forces to retreat.

Lessons from defeat

The failure of the Midway operation was the turning point of the entire war in the Pacific. The Japanese lost their best equipment and manpower. The combined fleet lost the initiative and since then has fought only defensive battles. At home, the admiral was subject to widespread criticism.

Was Isoroku Yamamoto's fault for the defeat? Book after book on this topic is being published today both in Japan and in other countries. Supporters and defenders of the military believe that his plan was no worse than the plans for similar operations among the Axis opponents. The main reason for the defeat of the Japanese was the luck of the Americans, who read the secret code and learned the plans of the United Fleet.

Battles of the Solomon Islands

In the second half of 1942, the war in the Pacific moved to New Guinea and Although Japan still had quite a few resources, they smoldered day after day. Yamamoto, having lost much of his reputation, took charge of minor operations. In August, he personally led the battle near the eastern Solomon Islands, and in November - the battle for the island of Guadalcanal.

In both cases, the Americans and their allies were victorious. The Japanese suffered defeats primarily due to the army's inability to operate effectively on the shores of the islands. Heavy losses decimated the ranks of destroyers, torpedo and dive bombers. In February 1943, Japan lost control of Guadalcanal. A series of battles in the Solomon Islands remained with the Americans.

Death

Despite defeat after defeat, the admiral did not give up. He continued to inspect troops and boost fleet morale. On the eve of one of these trips, the Americans again intercepted a secret message that contained detailed data about Yamamoto’s route. The discovery was reported to the White House. President Roosevelt demanded the elimination of the Japanese military leader.

On the morning of April 18, Yamamoto took off from Rabaul, a port on the island of New Britain. His plane had to travel almost 500 kilometers. On the way, the admiral's bomber was attacked by the Americans who staged a well-planned ambush. Yamamoto's plane crashed over one of the Solomon Islands.

After some time, a Japanese rescue squad arrived there. The admiral's body was found in the jungle - during the fall he was thrown out of the fuselage. The naval commander was cremated and buried in Tokyo. Posthumously he received the rank of Marshal, the Order of the Chrysanthemum, and also the German Order. During the war, the figure of Yamamoto became truly legendary. All of Japan was shocked by his death, and the country's leadership recognized the death of a national hero only a month after the American operation.

“If you say that we must fight, then in the first six months of the war against the United States and England I foresee an unbroken chain of victories. But I must say that if the war drags on for two or three years, then I am not confident in our final victory.”

From the address of I. Yamamoto to the Prime Minister of Japan Konoe. Summer 1941

Isoroku Takano (Yamamoto) was born on April 4, 1884 in the city of Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture. Isoroku was the sixth child in the family of the impoverished samurai Takano of the Nagaoka domain. Then he was adopted and took the surname of his adoptive father - Yamamoto. In 1904 he graduated from the Naval Academy. Participant in the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905). He served on the cruiser Nissin. In the Battle of Tsushima he received several wounds and lost two fingers on his hand.

FROM LIEUTENANT TO FLEET COMMANDER

In 1915, Yamamoto came up with the idea of ​​​​the need to create aircraft carrier ships (sort of floating airfields). In 1916 he received the rank of lieutenant commander (after graduating from the Naval College of High Command). In 1919-1921 he studied at Harvard University, then continued to serve in Japan, and was an observer on several European ships. In 1923, he became commander of the cruiser Isuzu, and in 1924, commander of the aircraft carrier Akagi. In 1925-1929 - military attache of Japan in the USA (in Washington). He took part in the second London Naval Conference (1930) with the rank of rear admiral and in the London Naval Conference (1934) with the rank of vice admiral. In 1936-1939 - Deputy Minister of Navy. Since 1939, Yamamoto has commanded the Empire's Combined Fleet. Thanks to his initiative, connections in the government and closeness to the Emperor of Japan, Isoroku Yamamoto, he was able to obtain significant funds for the development of the fleet, which by the end of the 1930s became one of the strongest in the Pacific.

FIRST VICTORIES

In 1940, Yamamoto authorized the reorganization of Japan's carrier force into the First Air Fleet, a fist that included six of Japan's largest aircraft carriers. And it was Isoroku Yamamoto who prepared the operation (using these six aircraft carriers) to destroy the American fleet in the main US Pacific base, Pearl Harbor.

The attack on Pearl Harbor took place on December 7, 1941. 341 carrier-based Japanese aircraft of the First Air Fleet bombed an American naval base in two raids (using the effect of surprise). As a result of the attack, eight US Navy battleships were sunk or severely damaged. In addition, Japanese aircraft sank and/or damaged three cruisers, three destroyers, and a minelayer; destroyed 188 American aircraft. True, US casualties were small: 2,403 killed and 1,178 wounded. Success cost the Japanese the loss of 29 aircraft and 5 midget submarines (in total, 64 Japanese were killed: 55 pilots and 9 submariners, another was captured). Despite the seemingly grandiose success of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese still failed to achieve absolute victory. And this, again, is the “merit” of Admiral Yamamoto. The admiral's ambition played into the hands of the Americans. Upon learning of the first success, he canceled the departure of the next wave of aircraft to Pearl Harbor, realizing that now the effect of surprise had passed and the losses would be much higher (that is, his victory would not be as clear).

Surprisingly, the Japanese lost several hundred of their aircraft during the (almost year-long) training for the attack on Pearl Harbor alone.

The admiral's decision to cancel subsequent missions further led to fatal consequences for Japan. Pearl Harbor's infrastructure, power plant, repair shops and docks, piers, huge oil reserves, various warehouses, supply ships (including giant tankers), 11 submarines remained untouched. In addition, the waters of Pearl Harbor are shallow, and the Americans managed to raise, repair and commission most of the sunken ships. And the US aircraft carriers were not damaged at all during the attack - they simply were not in Pearl Harbor that day.

The war in the Pacific went very well for Yamamoto at first. On the afternoon of December 8, Japanese base aircraft literally destroyed most of the American aircraft in the Philippines, and on December 10, 1941, shore-based aircraft (transferred by order of Yamamoto from the island of Formosa to Indochina) sank the British battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser Repulse. This allowed secure a military convoy heading for the landing of Japanese troops in Malaya. Sobering up from success began to come later.

WAR IN THE PACIFIC

On April 18, 1942, the first 16 American bombers, taking off from the Hornet aircraft carrier, bombed the territory of the Japanese islands proper. And during the operation to invade the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, Japanese aircraft carriers for the first time entered into battle with American aircraft carriers in the Coral Sea. Three Japanese aircraft carriers faced two American ones. The Japanese (7-8 May 1942) sank the US aircraft carrier Lexington and damaged the Yorktown, and they themselves lost only one light aircraft carrier, Seho. They considered the battle in the Coral Sea their victory, but the losses among experienced Japanese carrier-based aviation pilots were so great that the Japanese had to abandon the landing on New Guinea. In addition, the Japanese naval forces did not finish off the damaged Yorktown, which later backfired on them in the Battle of Midway Atoll.

In June 1942, Yamamoto personally led the attack on Midway Island, which resulted in a battle between American and Japanese carrier groups. Fortune was already on the side of the Americans here. The Japanese fleet lost four heavy aircraft carriers, the Americans lost only the long-suffering Yorktown. For the Japanese this was a real disaster.

In April 1943, Isoroku Yamamoto personally led Operation I-GO, which involved a series of air attacks as part of a strategic offensive against the island of Guadalcanal and southeastern New Guinea. Yamamoto had 190 base aircraft and 160 deck aircraft at his disposal... However, he no longer had enough strength to defeat the enemy.

DEATH OF AN ADMIRAL

On April 18, 1943, the plane in which Admiral Yamamoto was flying to the Solomon Islands was intercepted in the air by American fighters near the island of Bougainville. This was not a chance meeting in the air, it was a real ambush (more precisely, a specially prepared American operation), as a result of which Yamamoto’s plane was shot down by an American Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighter, and he himself was killed. This is how the Americans settled accounts with the talented Japanese admiral for the attack on Pearl Harbor. On the same day, the Japanese government promoted I. Yamamoto to fleet admiral (posthumously).

The naval commander's body was cremated, the ashes were returned to Japan and buried with honors on June 3, 1943. Some of Yamamoto's ashes rest in the Tama cemetery, and some in the family burial ground at Chuko-ji Temple in Nagaoka.

Yamamoto Isoroku

(04/04/1884-04/18/1943) - Japanese admiral. Participant in the Russian-Japanese (1904-1905) and World War II (1939-1945) wars

Isoroku Yamamoto was the commander of the combined Japanese fleet during the first stage of World War II. The skillful combination of naval and air combat, of which he was a master, allowed the Japanese to win a number of victories, and Yamamoto himself became famous as the best admiral in Japan.

Yamamoto was born in Nagaoka on April 4, 1884, into the family of an impoverished samurai who became a simple school teacher. Isoroku's parents had the surname Takano, and Isoroku later took his adoptive father's surname. In 1904, Isoroku graduated from the Naval Academy and almost immediately after graduation took part in the famous Battle of Tsushima, where the young Japanese navy almost completely destroyed the 2nd Russian Pacific Squadron.

At the end of the First World War, Isoroku Yamamoto was sent to the United States for three years at Harvard University to study English. Then he again served in Japan and visited as an observer on some ships of European countries. Yamamoto was interested in everything, especially the provision of fuel to the fleet, since he understood that in a future war this issue would occupy a key place in planning operations. Yamamoto soon became an expert in naval aviation, a new type of naval formation that was to play a decisive role in naval battles in the vast Pacific Ocean.

In 1925, the government sent him to the United States again, this time as a naval attaché. During his two years in this position, Yamamoto carefully studied the state of the US Navy.

Returning to his homeland in 1929, he received the rank of rear admiral and took command of the aircraft carrier Akagi.

In 1930, Yamamoto took part in the London Naval Conference, at which Japan managed to achieve an equal standard in submarines with the United States and England and a fairly favorable ratio in destroyers and cruisers. But even this state of affairs seemed unfair to the Japanese.

Yamamoto quickly moved up the ranks. In September 1930 he was transferred to the General Headquarters of Naval Aviation. In October 1933, Admiral Yamamoto was appointed commander of the 1st Carrier Fleet. And two years later he received the rank of vice admiral and at the same time became deputy minister of the navy and commander-in-chief of the 1st fleet.

Unlike most of his colleagues, Yamamoto believed that the future belonged to naval aviation. Thanks to his innovation and ability to obtain significant government funds for new military programs, the admiral created one of the most powerful and powerful fleets in the world by the end of the 1930s. The core of the new Japanese fleet was aircraft carriers.

By 1939, most Japanese military and political leaders began to realize that the only obstacle to gaining dominance in East Asia was the United States. Yamamoto did everything to prepare the Japanese Navy for the successful solution of any combat missions. But at the same time, he tried to avoid war and even opposed the signing of the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. Working in the USA, he understood perfectly well that thanks to powerful industry and unlimited resources, this country would be able to defeat little Japan. Yamamoto's anti-war statements led to the fact that a conspiracy began to mature in the army with the aim of physically eliminating the admiral, which was discovered in July 1939. When asked by Konoe, who was Prime Minister at the time, about Japan’s chances in a war with the United States, the admiral answered honestly: “In the first six to twelve months of the war, I will demonstrate an unbroken chain of victories. But if the confrontation lasts two or three years, I have no confidence in the final victory.” Konoe sent Yamamoto to sea, appointing him commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet. It is possible that by doing this he wanted to save the life of his admiral.

Admiral Yamamoto conducted staff exercises at sea, which showed that the Japanese had a chance to achieve an advantage only by delivering a surprise attack on the Hawaiian base of Pearl Harbor, where the main forces of the US Pacific Fleet were based. The admiral began to develop a plan for a surprise attack on this base. Initially, the main role in the operation was assigned to submarines; the use of aviation was not planned. In August 1941 the situation changed. Yamamoto proposed using aircraft carriers to attack Hawaii. The decision to start the war was made by Emperor Hirohito of Japan on December 1, 1941.

Back on November 26, 1941, a fleet of six aircraft carriers and auxiliary ships under the command of Yamamoto sailed to Hawaii along the Northern Sea Route, which was used extremely rarely. The aircraft carriers carried about 400 aircraft. This formation was tasked with launching a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in order to cause as much damage as possible to the US Pacific Fleet. The naval command gave this operation the code name "Operation Z". According to intelligence data, the American fleet was at its base. However, the operational plan provided for striking American ships even if they left the harbor. According to the operation plan, the Japanese fleet was supposed to covertly approach the Hawaiian Islands and destroy American ships with aircraft from aircraft carriers. Aviation had to operate in two echelons with an interval of one and a half hours. If the enemy tried to strike or the Japanese met a stronger group, a preemptive strike should have been carried out. At the end of the operation, the maneuver unit was to immediately return to Japan for repairs and replenishment of ammunition.

On the morning of December 7, Japanese aircraft carriers launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. Most of the American aircraft located on the islands were destroyed. The Japanese also managed to sink four battleships and put as many more out of action. In addition, the Americans lost a cruiser and two tankers, and many ships were seriously damaged. The first two Japanese attacks were so successful that the admiral abandoned his original intention of striking the docks and oil storage facilities. In two hours, Yamamoto managed to inflict the heaviest defeat on the American fleet in its entire history.

However, the main objective of the attack - the destruction of American aircraft carriers - was not completed. These ships were not in Pearl Harbor, since they were on maneuvers at that time. Yet the Japanese leadership perceived Yamamoto's almost flawless attack as a triumph.

In January 1941, the commander of the United Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, received a directive from Headquarters on the main directions of attack of the Japanese army. The Imperial Army and Navy were to capture the Philippines, Thailand, Malaya and Singapore. In accordance with the directive, the combat operations of the United Fleet were divided into three successive stages: the occupation of the Philippines, then British Malaya and finally the Dutch East Indies. To maintain supremacy at sea, Yamamoto specially created the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, whose task was to destroy American and British ships in the combat zone, as well as support the actions of ground forces. The commander of this formation was Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa.

The Malayan operation was considered by the Japanese command as the most important in capturing the South Seas region. During the war, the Japanese encountered virtually no resistance from the Allies. The operation ended with the surrender of the English fortress of Singapore, after which the small East Anglian Fleet was forced to leave this base and go to the Gulf of Thailand. During the battle that followed on December 10, the Japanese Navy, having lost only three aircraft, sank the battleship Prince of Wales and the battleship Repulse, which basically comprised all the British naval forces in this region.

In the Philippine direction, contrary to Yamamoto's expectations, the Japanese did not encounter ships of the American fleet. At the same time, large-scale preparations were launched for offensive operations in the central and southern parts of the Pacific Ocean, the implementation of which was entrusted to Admiral Yamamoto.

For this purpose, the South Seas Task Force was assigned under the command of Vice Admiral Shigiyoshi Inoue. This group was supposed to carry out patrol duty, ensure the security of maritime communications, and also capture the Wake Islands and the Rabaul base. The group's aircraft destroyed American airfields on three islands, and then the island of Guam was occupied on December 10, Wake on December 22, and Rabaul a day later. Japanese planes launched from aircraft carriers destroyed Allied aircraft in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea.

By March 1942, as a result of military operations at sea, the US fleet lost 5 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers, 4 cruisers and 8 destroyers. The small English fleet in this region was almost completely destroyed. On the Japanese side, only two cruisers received minor damage. One got the impression that the danger of waging an exhausting, protracted war had passed.

The Naval General Staff and the Navy Ministry, not wanting to lose the strategic initiative, insisted on the beginning of active actions against Australia. But the army advocated conducting strategic defense, refusing to seize new territories. The naval command eventually had to agree with the army's position. A compromise was reached, which consisted of conducting active operations on communications connecting the United States and Australia, in order to prevent the concentration of American troops in Australia and a subsequent attack on Japan. To achieve this, it was planned to capture the islands of Fiji, Samoa, New Caledonia and Port Moresby.

Port Moresby, located in the southeastern part of New Guinea and a major Allied air and naval base, covered northern Australia. Yamamoto set the start of the operation to capture this base on May 10, 1942. But on May 7, Allied planes sank the Japanese aircraft carrier Seho, which forced the landing to be postponed for several days. The next day, the Americans heavily damaged the aircraft carrier Shokaku and again forced Inoue to postpone the invasion, this time indefinitely.

As a result of the two-day battle in the Coral Sea, the Americans won their first victory over Yamamoto. The commander of the Combined Fleet sent orders to Admiral Inoue to continue the operation, but they were never carried out.

The operation to capture Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia, developed by the naval department of Headquarters, was called “FS”. But first, Yamamoto wanted to capture Midway Island and the Aleutian Islands, which caused new disagreements between the army and navy. The Operations Directorate of the General Staff suspected that the Navy was going to land troops on Hawaii. The command's plans previously considered the issue of capturing Midway, so that later, having created a base on it, they could begin to capture the Hawaiian Islands. Only after lengthy explanations and assurances that the capture of the Hawaiian Islands was not currently part of the Navy's plans was permission received to begin the operation to invade Midway.

By the beginning of 1942, the United States had gradually made up for the losses it had suffered at Pearl Harbor. Therefore, the prevailing opinion in the Japanese Navy was the need for a general battle with the American fleet, as a result of which the enemy fleet would either be destroyed or weakened so much that it could not interfere with operations.

By April 1942, large Japanese Navy forces allocated for the upcoming operation began to concentrate in the area near Hashira Island in the western part of the Inland Sea of ​​Japan. The flagship battleship Yamato, on which the headquarters of Admiral Yamamoto was located, was also located here. The combined fleet was preparing for a decisive battle.

Admiral Yamamoto's fleet consisted of 8 aircraft carriers, 10 battleships, 21 cruisers, 9 destroyers and 15 large submarines. Carrier-based aircraft consisted of 352 Zero fighters and 277 bombers. The Japanese command decided to throw all these powerful forces into capturing the island. The Americans had only 3 aircraft carriers, 8 cruisers and 14 destroyers. The ratio was one to three in favor of Japan. The admiral hoped to force the American fleet to leave Pearl Harbor, move north to the Aleutian Islands, and then try to relieve Midway and thereby fall into the trap set by Yamamoto's main units north of the atoll. The admiral did not know that American cryptographers managed to decipher the codes of the Japanese Navy and Nimitz, the commander of the US Navy, was well aware of the plans of the Japanese command. In addition, Japanese intelligence had incorrect information about the number of American aircraft carriers that survived the Battle of the Coral Sea.

On June 4, Yamamoto's fleet approached Midway, but the Japanese were met there by American aircraft carriers. Having set a trap for the Japanese, American planes attacked enemy ships and their aircraft while they were on the decks of the ships to refuel and replenish ammunition. As a result of the battle, the Americans managed to sink four of nine Japanese aircraft carriers and put an end to Yamamoto's triumphant march across the Pacific Ocean. This was the first defeat of the Japanese fleet in 350 years of existence. The war became protracted. And although the American fleet was already significantly stronger than the Japanese, Yamamoto himself remained the most dangerous enemy in the Pacific.

Having been defeated at Midway Island, the Japanese command still did not give up the fight on Australian communications. On the island of Guadalcanal, part of the Solomon Islands chain, back in May 1942, the Japanese decided to build an airfield and place a garrison. But on August 8, 1942, even before construction was completed, 13,000 US Marines suddenly landed on the island and captured the air base. Nevertheless, the Japanese managed to retain the western part of Guadalcanal. Admiral Yamamoto, given the seriousness of the situation, decided to concentrate most of his forces for a decisive blow against the enemy. On August 17, the main forces of the Combined Fleet, led by the flagship Yamato, left the Inland Sea of ​​Japan and headed for Guadalcanal to support the ground forces and recapture the entire island.

In the following months, fierce fighting broke out around this small piece of land. The Japanese never managed to recapture the airfield and drive the US Marines off the island.

In November 1942, two battles took place, during which both sides suffered heavy losses; in February 1943, the Japanese were forced to evacuate their troops from Guadalcanal.

After the evacuation of the troops, the current situation required the urgent transfer of Japanese troops to the southeastern part of the Pacific Ocean. But the convoy accompanying the reserve units was completely destroyed by American aircraft. The danger she posed became increasingly serious. To put an end to this, Admiral Yamamoto developed a plan codenamed Operation I. More than three hundred aircraft took part in this operation. The commander-in-chief arrived in Rabaul to personally lead the fighting.

On April 7, 1943, 188 Japanese bombers raided enemy ships off Guadalcanal. In the following days, the actions of Japanese aviation were very successful. But this was Admiral Yamamoto's last operation.

The American command had been developing a plan to eliminate the Japanese admiral for some time. And when the codebreakers transmitted a message about Yamamoto’s supposed trip to units located on the island, the command decided to act.

On April 18, 1943, the commander-in-chief left Rabaul for Buin. The plane Yamamoto was flying in was attacked by specially trained and instructed American fighter pilots, and after a short battle he was shot down. This was the only attempt on the life of an enemy commander made by the Allies during the war, indicating a real fear of his name.

Skritsky Nikolay Vladimirovich

ISOROKU YAMAMOTO Yamamoto, commanding the Imperial Navy, achieved significant success in the first stage of World War II thanks to the skillful combination of various types of the Japanese navy. Naval aviation became the main force. The future naval commander was born on April 4, 1884 in

From the book World History in sayings and quotes author Dushenko Konstantin Vasilievich

Opponent of the war with the United States, participant in the 1930 Naval Disarmament Conference and author of the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor. He died on April 18, 1943 during a special operation of the American Air Force, the purpose of which was.

Biography

Isoroku Yamamoto was born on April 4, 1884 in Nagaoka, Niigata Prefecture, Japan, into the family of an old but impoverished samurai family. The name Isoroku, given at birth, translated from Old Japanese, indicated the age of his father at that time, namely 56 years. He received the surname Yamamoto in 1916, when he was adopted by a family of the same name. At the age of 24, Isoroku got married. He had two sons and two daughters.

Russo-Japanese War

In 1904, Isoroku graduated from the Naval Academy and was sent to serve on a cruiser Nissin with the rank of cadet. While participating in the Battle of Tsushima, he was wounded in a gun explosion, as a result of which he lost two fingers on his left hand.

Interwar period

In 1914, Yamamoto graduated from the Naval Senior Command College. The first ship he commanded was a cruiser Isuzu in 1928. Isoroku then became involved in naval aviation and in December 1928 received command of an aircraft carrier Akagi. In 1930, after receiving the rank of rear admiral, he took part in the London Disarmament Conference as a military expert for the Japanese diplomatic delegation.
Isoroku did not hide his negative attitude towards the idea of ​​war with the United States, the Berlin Pact and the invasion of Manchuria. This caused hostility on the part of many high-ranking officials of the Japanese Empire.

However, Yamamoto's professional qualities and his good attitude towards his subordinates made it possible to make a career in the navy, despite existing disagreements. On August 30, 1939, Isoroku was appointed commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

The Second World War

Yamamoto played a very important role in World War II in general and how Japan entered it in particular. It was he who developed the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor and ensured its implementation. Despite his attitude towards the upcoming war, he understood that he was unable to prevent the inevitable. Therefore, being a devoted officer, he tried to do everything so that Japan had a chance to win. The creation of the first Air Fleet of the 6 largest aircraft carriers, the influence on Japan's naval strategy, and contribution to the development of aviation - this is only part of Yamamoto's merits.
At the same time, many moments had two sides. For example, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was a failure in a political sense, since it began before the official declaration of war. From a strategic point of view, the creation of the First Air Fleet, which served as the main striking force of the Japanese fleet, was justified, but it also had a second side - great vulnerability. And if at the beginning of the war such a decision brought a number of victories, then in the Battle of Midway it contributed to the death of four aircraft carriers at once.

Death

Yamamoto's influence on the course of the war and the morale of the fleet was so high that in April 1943, on the orders of Roosevelt, a plan was implemented to eliminate him. Having deciphered radio communications about plans to move the admiral, on April 18, the Americans sent a squadron of fighters to intercept the bomber on which Isoroku was traveling during an inspection of troops in the Solomon Islands. The covering group was unable to withstand the superior enemy forces and the admiral's plane was shot down and exploded, falling into the jungle.
The Japanese government recognized the death of the commander-in-chief only on May 21, 1943. Posthumously, Isoroku Yamamoto was awarded the honorary title of Admiral of the Fleet (Marshal-Admiral). The funeral took place on June 3, 1943.

Chronology of obtaining titles

date Rank
14.11.1904 Junior Lieutenant (Japanese) Kaigun Shōi Kōhosei)
31.08.1905 Lieutenant (Japanese: 海軍少尉 Kaigun Shōi)
28.09.1907 Senior Lieutenant (Japanese: 海軍中尉 Kaigun Chūi)
11.10.1909 Lieutenant Commander (Japanese: 海軍大尉 Kaigun Daii)
13.12.1915 Captain 3rd rank (Japanese: 海軍少佐 Kaigun Shōsa)
01.12.1919 Captain 2nd rank (Japanese: 海軍中佐 Kaigun Chūsa)
01.12.1923 Captain 1st rank (Japanese: 海軍大佐 Kaigun Daisa)
30.11.1929 Rear Admiral (Japanese: 海軍少将 Kaigun Shōshō)
15.11.1934 Vice Admiral (Japanese: 海軍中将 Kaigun Chūjō)
15.11.1940 Admiral (Japanese: 海軍大将 Kaigun Taishō)
18.04.1943 Fleet Admiral (Japanese) 元帥海軍大将 Gensui Kaigun-Taishō)

Image in art and media

An interesting excerpt from the biography of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (author Hiroyuki Agawa), about
Admiral's attitude to unconventional methods of determining the abilities of naval pilots
aviation...


Brief background: in the mid-1930s, Japanese naval aviation was harassed
problem of high accident rate. It was believed that at least part of the problem was caused by
an inadequate system for selecting candidates for naval pilots. And then one day the head of the education department
Department of Aeronautics under Yamamoto, Captain 1st Rank Onishi Takijiro (later -
"father" of kamikaze squadrons) called Kuwabara, deputy commander of the Kasumigaura Air Corps,
giving him unusual information...

"...Various investigations have been carried out into the causes of accidents; one of the sensitive problems is
how to evaluate potential crew members. Before admission, cadets and reserve cadets carefully
screened, subjected to tests of learning ability and physical fitness; after
their compliance with the tasks to be solved was strictly checked; even so many
after the first six months or so they turned out to be inadequate. It wouldn't matter much
if expelling them from courses did not entail unnecessary waste of money and shame for those expelled. But on
practice, even before their removal, accidents occurred many times due to their fault. One or two
times precious lives were lost, and the destruction of expensive aircraft equipment imposed
further burdens on the already limited budget.

Experts from the Department of Psychology of the Tokyo Imperial University were invited to conduct the tests.
university. Those selected for this purpose were initially found in perfect order, but later they were often not
lived up to expectations. Experimental psychology seemed to be of little help in determining
the necessary capabilities, and the main problem of aviation was still identifying the appropriate
pilot candidates. Head of the Education Department of the Aeronautics Department under Yamamoto, Captain of the 1st
rank Onishi Takijiro (loyal supporter of Yamamoto; by the end of the war gained fame as "father"
suicide squadrons - kamikazes; an ardent apologist for war to the last soldier) once called
Kuwabara, deputy commander of the Kasumigaura Air Corps. Here's the gist of what he said:

“At my father-in-law’s school, the headmaster of Juntendo High School, there are quite a few graduates
an unusual young man named Mizuno. He studied history at university and his diploma
the work concerned ancient methods of divination. As a child he was interested in palmistry and
physiognomy. Having read once in the newspapers that naval aviation had recently lost many aircraft,
he stated: this is because the Navy uses incorrect methods for selecting pilots. "Inclined to
fantasies,” I thought. But then I met him personally, and he told me: find out if a person is fit
You can become a pilot by palm or face, but recruiting pilots in batches is wrong.
Personally, I don’t think that the Navy recruits pilots in batches, but nevertheless I asked if it could be
he himself determines the suitability of this or that. "Oh yeah!" - he answered absolutely confidently.
I will send him to you in Kasumigaura with a letter of recommendation - why don’t you listen to this
person, at least for fun, and not give him the opportunity to read the pattern of papillary lines on
the palms of your people.

Kuwabara, ready to grasp at any straw, agreed to meet with the young man,
and on the appointed day, Mizuno Yoshito presented himself in the building, having with him a letter of recommendation
Onishi's letter. It was lunchtime, and there was a constant stream of people in flight suits coming from the airfield.
Kuwabara suggested inviting instructors after lunch - about one hundred and twenty people: let
Mizuno will try his methods on them, dividing them into three categories - their suitability for any
work or for flights. He promised to have at hand a list of all instructors with notes about their
qualifications acquired over a long period of time.

Everyone has gathered; Mizuno stared at each one in turn for five or six seconds, and then
assigned a category - A, B or C. When Kuwabara and his assistant compared these ranks with marks,
put on the list, then, to their amazement, they discovered that the ranks and marks coincided in 86
percentage of cases. That day, all the cadets were gathered and subjected to the same procedure; this time
compliance was 87 percent. Kuwabara and the others were stunned: this young man,
clearly not connected with the world of aviation, in five or six seconds he made conclusions that corresponded more
than in 80 percent of cases, conclusions made by themselves months, or even years after
the cadet's arrival at the unit. We intended to have fun, but it turned out that we had to accept everything
seriously.

Having learned that Mizuno still has not found a job and is free to come and go as he pleases
as he pleased, the base leaders left him in Kasumigaura overnight to talk
with the officers. One officer, named Nanamoto, was worried about what to do with his upcoming marriage;
asked Mizuno to look at the palms of this officer.

— You apparently don’t have a clear decision about marriage, right? - Mizuno turned to him.
- You need to finally settle on the first option.

The "first option" - the girl Nanamoto is engaged to - contradicted the other:
the family forced a bride on him for material gain.

Mizuno also announced that he believed war would break out within a year or so.
Kuwabara objected: even if the war starts, it won’t be so soon; everything happened in the summer of 1936,
that is, a year before the “China Incident” broke out. Then, when Mizuno's prediction
came true, Kuwabara asked what led him to such an idea.

“In childhood, when I first became interested in palmistry and physiognomy,” Mizuno answered, “I
I noticed that many were walking along the streets of Tokyo with the stamp of death on their faces. This is not normal, I thought
me, - I didn’t notice this in Osaka. And then the great Kanto earthquake happened, and I understood everything.
It’s the same now: I can’t take my eyes off many women on the streets of Tokyo - you can see from their faces
that in a year or two they will become widows. So I came to the conclusion that this time it was not due to natural
they will lose their husbands in the cataclysm.

A well-known fact: at the beginning of the “Chinese incident” the 101st division - the majority in it were
natives of Tokyo - suffered heavy losses in the battles near Shanghai.

As soon as Mizuno left, Kuwabara called Onishi.
“You know,” he began, “there is something hidden from view in him.” I would like to think if it is possible somehow
use his methods when forming crews; I would like him to go deeper with this
got busy. How to hire him, say, for the position of adviser at the aeronautics department,
to facilitate his access to naval aviation units?

Onishi obviously had no objections, since he himself took the initiative; Kuwabara directed
report addressed to the command of the Kasumigaura air corps: as proven by cases of manifestation of innate
common sense and acupuncture, ancient and clearly unscientific methods need not be discarded
from accounts; immediately cited the opinion of statistical experts - a coincidence in 60 percent of cases
and more should be considered a sign of reliability.

Now Onishi had to introduce the report to others and convince them of the reasonableness of the accumulated
recommendations. I introduced him to the personnel bureau and the maritime affairs bureau and tried to persuade him
management accepted Mizuno to work as an adviser, but was met with skeptical grins everywhere.

“Listen, don’t you really think that the navy...,” they whispered around, “I want to say—
physiognomy...

Kuwabara attributed his failure to the narrow "rationalism" of the relevant individuals in the two naval bureaus.
To the Bureau of Maritime Affairs, all this looked like proof that aviation had finally lost
reason. When it became obvious that nothing was working, Kuwabara asked Onishi if he had spoken
he's with Yamamoto. No, I didn’t say: together we went to see Yamamoto for a reception. At first, asking him not to
laugh, began to tell the story with Mizuno in detail and turned to Yamamoto for help in
appointing this person as an adviser. Yamamoto smiled as he listened to them, and when they finished, he said:

- It's clear. I'll talk to him myself, but let him come alone.

We agreed to bring Mizuno here; then on the phone while Yamamoto was talking for his part
with different departments of the personnel bureau and the maritime affairs bureau and with the aeronautics department,
about twenty different people were gathered in the office. When Mizuno arrived, the first thing he asked was
Yamamoto - what, in his eyes, is palmistry and physiognomy.

He answered - as Kuwabara had already explained in the Kasumigaura Air Corps - that these are applied branches
statistics. Popular folk beliefs, such as the Japanese belief that people with
long, rabbit-like ears, attentive and soft in nature, or that square chin
means this and that, are based, in essence, on empirical statistical observations. These
beliefs are not necessarily true in every case, but it’s not fifty-fifty either. Also
intuition gives precision to individual observations.

“Well, okay,” Yamamoto nodded. — Twenty people have gathered here. Can you tell who
Are any of them pilots?

Mizuno carefully looked at each person's face in turn. Finally he pointed to one:

- It's you, isn't it? - and then to another: - And you too. These two were named Hoshi Kazuo and Miwa Yoshitake,
both among the best fighter pilots that naval aviation could boast of at that time.
Hoshi and Miwa smiled modestly under the surprised looks of the others.

- That's it, no more? - Yamamoto hurried.
“That’s all,” Mizuno replied.

Here is another one of those present, captain second rank Taguchi from the naval general staff,
said: “I’m a pilot too!”

Mizuno took his hand and examined it carefully.
- You may be a pilot, but not a very good one.

Everyone started looking at each other again, then there was laughter. Wu Taguchi, a graduate of the Maritime College
General Staff, naval pilot, excellent brains, but too slow of a reaction for a pilot.
He happened to damage the plane during landing; he was recently transferred to the naval general headquarters with
warning: if it doesn’t gather all the attention, it will eventually break into pieces.

Several more demonstrations of Mizuno's mysterious abilities followed. Subjected to research
palms of captain 1st rank Kida Tatsuhiko.

-Have you taken someone else's name for yourself? - Mizuno asked.
Kida did not want to answer, but under pressure he admitted with sad delight that he really
Foster-son.

Finally Yamamoto decided that the time had come, and the assembly decided to accept without further fuss
Mizuno to work. Soon after this, he was officially appointed as an adviser to the department.
Aeronautics. His duty in this capacity is to be present at all cadet inspections
and reserve cadet in the Kasumigaura Air Corps and study their palms and faces.

The Navy began using Mizuno's methods in combination with routine written and physical checks;
The most promising of all candidates was considered to be the one who received good grades in these two
exams and a “go-ahead” from Mizuno. Therefore, it is not entirely correct to say (as in some places during
war) that the Naval Air Corps was governed by prejudice.

As a result, Mizuno's busyness exceeded all limits. During the war he received help
two assistants and he had to travel so much to air units that they began to prepare in advance
mimeographed fingerprints. In total, he is said to have analyzed
over 230 thousand people.

In 1941, in the presence of Kuwabara Torao, who trusted him completely, Mizuno predicted
that the war will begin this year.

- Well, how will it end? - Kuwabara asked.
“Everything will go well at first,” Mizuno answered, “but then I can’t say.”

- Why?
“I don’t like looking into the faces of people from the General Staff: I see them hurrying along the corridors.”
with documents. I'm worried about their future.

Four years later, in July 1945, Kuwabara - then a vice admiral assigned to the ministry
military supplies,” Mizuno asked how he thought the war would develop further.

“It will all be over by the end of next month.”
Puzzled, Kuwabara asked why he thought that.

— I recently visited several kamikaze pilot bases and noticed: very few young
officers and civilians have signs of death on their faces. I took this as a signal that war was coming
end.

Later in the war, Mizuno worked as an adviser to the Ministry of Justice at Chofu Convict Prison.
studying the physiognomy of criminals; long before that he was kicked out by order
superiors; He now works as a consultant for Komatsu Store in Tokyo's Ginza district, giving
advice on recruitment and placement of personnel.

It seems that Mizuno noted the names of everyone who fits the profession of an aviator, but is susceptible
accidents, and kept this list in his safe. According to him, two thirds of them
That's how they died.
It is impossible to say to what extent Mizuno's methods corresponded to pure applied statistics,
or included elements of parapsychology, or even contained elements of hypnosis or some kind of deception.
Yes, this is not so important for us. What’s interesting is the attitude towards Mizuno Yamamoto. With one
On the other hand, it testified that he cares about the condition of his subordinates; on the other hand, it reflected him
a tendency to almost intuitively believe (or at least not ignore) what comes out
beyond the limits accepted in science and logic. "